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  INTRODUCTION   
In arguing that President Washington could not interpret a 
mutual defense treaty that potentially required America to join 
battle with France—but that only Congress could interpret the 
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treaty on account of its power to declare war—James Madison 
reasoned as follows: 
[T]he same specific function or act, cannot possibly belong to the two 
departments and be separately exerciseable by each.  
  . . . . 
  A concurrent authority in two independent departments to per-
form the same function with respect to the same thing, would be as 
awkward in practice, as it is unnatural in theory.1 
Madison’s approach has broad implications beyond the specific 
question he was examining. Because the Constitution spends 
most of its time allocating power to specific institutions, the 
question of whether constitutionally allocated power is exclu-
sively held by a single institution (as Madison believed), or in-
stead can be concurrently held by two, is pervasive.  
Probably nowhere else has Madison’s view of the basic ar-
chitecture of American constitutionalism proven to be so wrong. 
This Article shows that concurrence—what Madison believed to 
be “awkward in practice . . . [and] unnatural in theory”2—is to-
day widespread. In doing so, the Article uncovers an integral, 
yet largely overlooked, feature of constitutional law. 
As regards separation of powers, for example, though the 
Constitution gives the President the “Power to grant Reprieves 
and Pardons,”3 Congress can grant amnesties that, according to 
the Supreme Court, are functionally equivalent to pardons.4 
Similarly, while the Constitution specifies only one mechanism 
(treaty) through which the federal government can create in-
ternational agreements,5 many contemporary international ob-
ligations have been created by congressional-executive agree-
ments, which do not require a supermajority of senators.6  
With regard to “vertical” federalism, though Congress has 
the power to regulate interstate commerce, states also have 
power to regulate interstate commerce.7 With respect to “hori-
 
 1. JAMES MADISON, HELVIDIUS NUMBER II (1793), reprinted in ALEXAN-
DER HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 
1793–1794: TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 68–69 
(Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007). 
 2. Id. at 69. 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 4. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896) (recognizing this and not-
ing that the difference between pardons and amnesties is “one rather of philo-
logical interest than of legal importance” (quoting Knote v. United States, 95 
U.S. 149, 153 (1877))). 
 5. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 6. See infra Part I.B. 
 7. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851). 
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zontal” federalism, multiple states frequently have power to re-
gulate a given person, transaction, or occurrence.8  
Concurrent power is found in other contexts beyond sepa-
ration of powers and federalism. For example, though the Se-
venth Amendment allocates adjudicatory fact-finding power to 
the jury, institutions apart from juries also find facts: adminis-
trative law judges in Article I courts find facts in the very same 
contests where juries would have the constitutional power to 
fact-find, and Article III judges engage in fact-finding of the 
sort performed by juries when they decide motions for sum-
mary judgment and motions to grant judgment as a matter of 
law. To provide one last example, although the power to sue 
government contractors belongs to the executive branch, it does 
not rest exclusively there: qui tam statutes empower private 
citizens to sue, on behalf of the United States, anyone who has 
submitted a false claim to the federal government.9 The power 
to sue government contractors to recover for false claims accor-
dingly rests with both the federal executive and private citi-
zens.10  
Though commentators focusing on discrete doctrines some-
times have recognized that governmental powers can overlap,11 
this Article is the first to comprehensively analyze the pheno-
menon of concurrence. Examining multiple doctrinal contexts, 
this Article uncovers patterns that can lead to a more informed 
choice between exclusivity and concurrence in the future. This 
is important because many contested contemporary issues im-
plicate the choice between exclusivity and concurrence. For ex-
ample, though the Constitution specifically vests the power to 
declare war with Congress, does the President also have a simi-
 
 8. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981); Mark D. Ro-
sen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, and Institutional Con-
siderations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 729–30 
(2007). 
 9. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006). 
 10. See id. Likewise, the posse comitatus doctrine allowed state and feder-
al executive officials to compel private citizens to assist in the making of ar-
rests and in otherwise executing a wide range of state and federal laws, exem-
plifying yet another instance of concurrence: executive power that is jointly 
exercised by the executive branch and private sector. See infra note 337. 
 11. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 (2000) 
(“[N]early every federal statute addresses an area in which the states also 
have authority to legislate . . . .”); Lee H. Rosenthal, Back in the Court’s Court, 
74 UMKC L. REV. 687, 695–96 (2006) (noting that problems arising from as-
bestos can be handled either by legislatures or courts). 
  
2010] FROM EXCLUSIVITY TO CONCURRENCE 1055 
 
lar power?12 Or, are there mechanisms outside of Article V by 
which the Constitution can, in effect, be amended?13  
This Article is composed of six parts. Part I formally de-
fines concurrence and exclusivity, and then identifies seven 
contemporary instances of concurrence. Part I also explains 
concurrence’s relation to the familiar concepts of checks and 
balances, enumerated powers, and expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius. Part I concludes by closely analyzing James Madison’s 
argument for exclusivity that appears in his famed Helvidius 
Number II, as well as Alexander Hamilton’s response in sup-
port of concurrence.14  
This Article’s next four parts identify and analyze recur-
ring patterns that emerge across multiple doctrines in Ameri-
can constitutional law. Part II uncovers a stunning historical 
pattern: virtually all places where power today is held concur-
rently amount to reversals of the Court’s original view that the 
power in question was held exclusively by only one institution. 
Part II documents the doctrinal process by which the Supreme 
Court came to accept concurrence in several arenas. In so 
doing, the Supreme Court rejected categorical application of the 
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means 
“to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the 
other, or of the alternative.”15 Part II also shows, however, that 
concurrence has not eclipsed exclusivity. Many of the Constitu-
tion’s power allocations are, and always have been, understood 
as vesting power in solely one institution, and there is at least 
one instance of a countertrajectory where the Court stepped 
back somewhat from concurrence and headed back towards ex-
clusivity.16 
 
 12. See Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential Declarations of War, 37 U.C. DA-
VIS L. REV. 321, 324 (2003) (concluding that the President can declare wars). 
 13. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 44–47 
(1991) (arguing that the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted by me-
chanisms outside of Article V); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social 
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (2006) (“[O]fficials responsible for interpreting the 
Constitution might respond to the shifts in popular opinion that a campaign to 
amend the Constitution produced, even if, by formal measures, the People en-
dorsed the status quo.”). 
 14. For an informative overview of the Madison-Hamilton exclusivity de-
bates, see H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS 47–51 (2002). 
 15. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009). 
 16. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). 
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Part III explores how and why there has been a switch 
from exclusivity to concurrence. Part III first uncovers three re-
curring mechanisms by which concurrence is generated. It then 
shows that, because courts tend to start with exclusivist as-
sumptions, concurrence typically was initiated by nonjudicial 
institutions, and gained judicial approval only after becoming 
entrenched. An array of pragmatic considerations fueled the 
shift from exclusivity to concurrence: concurrence has been 
turned to when the most obviously tasked institution has failed 
to act, to conscript another institution’s complementary compe-
tencies and thereby improve governmental activity, to achieve 
administrative efficiencies, to solve problems unanticipated by 
the Founders, and to meet emergencies.17 
Part IV points out that the choice between exclusivity and 
concurrence is not “all or nothing.” Much power is still exclu-
sively held by a single institution. Moreover, even where there 
is concurrence, there typically are limits on the degree to which 
power can be shared among two or more institutions. Taken as 
a whole, Part IV suggests that the choice between exclusivity 
and concurrence has been made not on the basis of transsub-
stantive or categorical principles, but on context-specific de-
terminations. This suggests that slippery slope concerns articu-
lated by some scholars—that permitting concurrence in one 
context could lead to the disappearance of exclusivity and con-
comitant chaos—are overblown.18 
Part V addresses one of concurrence’s crucial downsides: 
the chance of conflict between institutions with overlapping 
powers. But this is not a reason to categorically reject concur-
rence. Part V shows that American law has developed many 
methods for dealing with interinstitutional conflict. According-
ly, while the possibility of conflict is a veritable cost to be 
weighed against concurrence’s potential benefits, it is not a ba-
sis for rejecting concurrence as an a priori matter.  
Part VI draws lessons from this Article’s findings. After 
considering four different “metanarratives” that help explain 
the shift from exclusivity to concurrence, Part VI considers the 
constitutional implications of its findings. Context-specific con-
siderations have guided the choice between exclusivity and con-
 
 17. See infra Part III.B. 
 18. For an example of such a concern in a context relevant to concurrence, 
see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 
93 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1053 (2007) (arguing that delegation by the President ab-
ridges the power of the executive branch). 
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currence. This Article defends this practice, explaining why 
concurrence is not per se unconstitutional under expressio un-
ius est exclusio alterius and why it is not inconsistent with the 
concept of enumerated powers. Concurrence has been embraced 
from the start of our nation, and the Constitution’s text almost 
never forecloses it. The choice between exclusivity and concur-
rence is appropriately made on a context-by-context basis, 
though experience from other contexts may be illuminating.  
I.  THE ANALYTICS OF CONCURRENCE, AND SOME 
EXAMPLES   
After defining concurrence and exclusivity, this Part sur-
veys seven contemporary examples of concurrence, introduces 
several analytical tools that deepen an understanding of con-
currence, and analyzes Hamilton’s and Madison’s debates con-
cerning the choice between exclusivity and concurrence—the 
earliest and most exhaustive discussion of the subject to date. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
“Concurrence” refers to the arrangement where a given ac-
tivity, X, can be performed by more than one institution, de-
spite the fact that the Constitution appears to place the power 
to do X in one specified institution. “Exclusivity” refers to the 
situation where a given activity, X, can be performed by only a 
single institution. By “institution,” I include the different enti-
ties that are explicitly referenced in the Constitution (for ex-
ample, Congress, the Supreme Court, other Article III courts, 
the President, states, juries, and the people), as well as novel 
entities not mentioned in the Constitution, such as administra-
tive agencies and supranational tribunals.  
B. CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES 
What follows—by way of description, not justification—are 
seven contemporary examples of concurrence. 
1.  The Constitution states that “[i]n all Cases affecting 
Ambassadors . . . and those in which a State shall be Party, the 
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”19 Though the 
Supreme Court indeed has original jurisdiction in these cases, 
inferior district courts also have original jurisdiction over cases 
brought by ambassadors and, in many cases, also over cases 
 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
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brought by states.20 Accordingly, notwithstanding the Constitu-
tion’s allocation of original jurisdiction over cases affecting am-
bassadors and in which states are a party to the Supreme Court, 
district courts have concurrent authority to exercise original ju-
risdiction over such cases. 
2.  Article III of the Constitution states that “[t]he judicial 
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.”21 Today, however, a signifi-
cant amount of adjudication concerning federal matters occurs 
in non-Article III federal courts.22 For example, contract and 
property claims against the United States are heard in the non-
Article III United States Court of Federal Claims,23 and admin-
istrative agencies can hear disputes between private parties as 
to the compensation owed to an injured maritime worker.24 
These non-Article III institutions can oversee these adjudica-
tions despite the fact that both the above-mentioned claims also 
could have been heard in Article III courts; contract and prop-
erty claims against the United States also fall within federal 
district courts’ jurisdiction, and federal district courts have 
“long handled maritime personal injury claims.”25 Indeed, “at 
least in some circumstances, virtually all of the kinds of cases 
that are heard in Article III courts, including criminal cases 
and civil disputes arising under the Constitution, laws, and 
treaties of the Unites States,” can be heard in non-Article III 
federal courts.26 Accordingly, notwithstanding the Constitu-
 
 20. See Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 469–72 (1884); see also infra Part 
II.A (analyzing Ames in detail). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 22. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN 
THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 36–51 (1980); James E. Pfander, Article 
I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646 (2004) (“Congress has often assigned disputes that 
appear to fall within the scope of the federal judicial power to Article I tribun-
als whose judges lack salary and tenure protections.”). 
 23. Pfander, supra note 22, at 657. 
 24. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932). 
 25. Pfander, supra note 22, at 657 n.52, 659. 
 26. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, 
and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 923 (1988). Consider, as well, the vari-
ous supranational adjudicatory panels created under federal law. For example, 
whereas the conclusions of the federal agencies tasked with administering the 
United States antidumping laws typically are subject to judicial review by Ar-
ticle III courts, the North American Free Trade Implementation Act creates 
new adjudicatory entities that are staffed by representatives of the two disput-
ing countries. For a discussion of this issue, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Article 
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tion’s allocation of the judicial power to Article III courts, non-
Article III courts frequently have concurrent authority to adju-
dicate disputes. 
3.  The Constitution states that “[t]he President . . . shall 
have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses 
against the United States.”27 The Supreme Court has held that 
this provision does not “take from Congress the power to pass 
acts of general amnesty,”28 notwithstanding the fact that “[t]he 
distinction between amnesty and pardon is of no practical im-
portance”29 and “is one rather of philological interest than of le-
gal importance.”30 Accordingly, notwithstanding the Constitu-
tion’s allocation of the pardon power solely to the President, 
Congress has concurrent authority to undertake acts that have 
the functionally identical effect of legally forgiving past illegali-
ties. 
4.  The Constitution specifies only one mechanism by which 
the United States can create international agreements—the 
treaty—concerning which it states that the “[President] shall 
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur.”31 Many of the most important international agree-
ments that the United States entered into during the twentieth 
century, however, are not treaties, but, instead, are congres-
sional-executive agreements, which are negotiated by the Pres-
ident and approved by simple majorities of both houses of Con-
gress.32 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law 
 
III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 835–39 
(2007). These adjudicatory entities are not Article III courts, yet they have the 
power to “directly apply domestic American legal standards” and “issue orders 
directly binding federal administrative officials without a right of appeal to 
federal courts.” Id. at 837. 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 28. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (quoting Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877)).  
 31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 303(2) (1986). International agreements also have been 
created by the so-called sole executive agreements, which are negotiated by 
the President and subject to no congressional approval whatsoever. See id. 
§ 303(4). For example, President Carter’s sole executive agreement, known as 
the “Algiers Accords,” gained release of the U.S. diplomatic personnel who 
were taken hostage in 1979 in Iran. Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Ex-
ecutive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1608 (2007). Similarly, President 
Clinton negotiated an agreement with German Chancellor Schroder establish-
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of the United States takes the position that “any agreement 
concluded as a Congressional-Executive agreement could also 
be concluded by treaty” and notes that “[t]he prevailing view is 
that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an 
alternative to the treaty method in every instance.”33 A promi-
nent example of the congressional-executive agreement is the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, which received sixty-
one supporting votes and thirty-eight “noes” in the Senate34—
short of the two-thirds of senators present necessary for a trea-
ty.35 The agreement bringing the United States into the World 
Trade Organization was also a congressional-executive agree-
ment, not a treaty.36 Accordingly, notwithstanding the Consti-
tution’s specification of the treaty as the sole mechanism for 
creating international obligations, the President has concurrent 
authority with the Senate to create international obligations by 
means of congressional-executive agreements. 
5.  The Constitution states that “[a]ll legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States.”37 Most legal scholars who have examined the issue 
agree that many administrative agencies have virtually unfet-
tered discretion to generate regulations that are functionally 
indistinguishable from statutes.38 For example, the Supreme 
Court has upheld statutes that instruct agencies to regulate on 
the basis of “public interest, convenience, or necessity,”39 to set 
“fair and equitable prices,”40 or to set ambient air quality stan-
dards that are “requisite to protect the public health.”41 Accor-
dingly, notwithstanding the Constitution’s allocation of “[a]ll 
legislative Powers herein granted” to Congress, administrative 
agencies have concurrent authority to create the rules that go-
vern behavior.  
 
ing a mechanism for handling insurance claims held by Holocaust victims. See 
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 406–08 (2003). 
 33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e.  
 34. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 799, 801 (1995). 
 35. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 36. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 917–19. 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 38. See infra Part II.D.  
 39. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943). 
 40. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427 (1944). 
 41. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 469 (2001). 
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6.  The Constitution states that “Congress shall have Power 
To . . . regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”42 The 
United States Supreme Court has held, however, that states 
also have the power to regulate interstate commerce.43 Accor-
dingly, notwithstanding the Constitution’s allocation of regula-
tory authority over interstate commerce to Congress, states and 
Congress have concurrent authority to regulate interstate com-
merce. 
7.  Congress has the power to enact laws relating to admi-
ralty44 and laws governing interstate disputes concerning such 
matters as water pollution.45 Yet there also is a “tradition of 
federal common lawmaking in admiralty,”46 as well as a “feder-
al common law of nuisance” regarding interstate waters.47 Ac-
cordingly, Congress and federal courts have concurrent authori-
ty to create the rules of admiralty, as well as the rules that 
govern many interstate controversies. 
C. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS 
For purposes of fully understanding concurrence, it will 
first prove useful to introduce three analytical tools. This sub-
part then considers concurrence’s relation to three familiar 
constitutional principles: checks and balances, the canon of ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius, and the concept of enumer-
ated powers. 
1. Three Analytical Tools 
a. Same-Effect Versus Same-Source Concurrence  
i. Definition  
“Same-effect” concurrence refers to the circumstance where 
two institutions have the power to undertake X, but pursuant 
to different sources of power. Consider Example 4, above: the 
constitutional provision that gives rise to congressional-
 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 43. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319–20 (1851) 
(noting that, under certain circumstances, the states have the authority to re-
gulate interstate commerce). 
 44. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (“Congress has para-
mount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail 
throughout the country.”). 
 45. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101–02 (1972). 
 46. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994).  
 47. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 107. 
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executive agreements is not Article II’s treaty power, but is, in-
stead, Article I’s grant of legislative power to Congress.48 Simi-
larly, whereas the President’s power to issue pardons derives 
from Article II, Congress’s power to issue immunities stems 
from its Commerce Clause powers under Article I.49 Same-
effect concurrence hence describes the situation where two (or 
more) of the Constitution’s grants of power overlap with the re-
sult that more than one institution has the power to effectuate 
act X. 
“Same-source” concurrence refers to the situation where 
two different institutions exercise the same power. For exam-
ple, Professor Thomas Merrill is of the view that administrative 
agencies exercise the very legislative power that the Constitu-
tion grants to Congress.50 Similarly, Professor Henry Monag-
han believes that Article I courts can exercise much of the fed-
eral judicial power that the Constitution grants to Article III 
courts.51  
Is it useful to distinguish between “same-effect” and “same-
source” concurrence? Yes, but the distinction is less important 
than courts and scholars assume. The rest of this subpart dis-
cusses several Supreme Court opinions and scholarly works 
that have assumed the distinction to be crucial, and then con-
siders to what extent the distinction really should matter after 
all.  
ii. Judicial and Scholarly Reliance on the Distinction 
Many court opinions and scholars presume the importance 
of the distinction between same-effect and same-source concur-
rence. Consider the long-standing controversy as to whether 
non-Article III courts exercise Article III judicial power, or 
something else. Embracing same-effect concurrence, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall famously upheld territorial courts on the ground 
that they are incapable of receiving Article III judicial power, 
 
 48. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 804–05 (stating that Con-
gress may approve congressional-executive agreements by passing “an ordi-
nary statute or a joint resolution, or enact[ing] implementing legislation ne-
cessary for the agreement’s legal effectiveness” (footnote omitted)). 
 49. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896) (stating that the sta-
tute in question, which was passed by Congress under its Commerce Clause 
power, was “virtually an act of general amnesty”). 
 50. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondele-
gation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2181 (2004). 
 51. See Monaghan, supra note 26, at 868 (“[S]ignificant federal adjudica-
tion [can] occur in non-Article III tribunals.”). 
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and that, instead, they exercise something other than Article 
III judicial power.52 The modern Court, by contrast, has come 
asymptotically close to adopting same-source concurrence when 
concluding that Congress may “authorize the adjudication of 
Article III business in a non-Article III tribunal,” provided that 
the congressional decision does not impermissibly threaten “the 
institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”53 Professor Mo-
naghan likewise happily describes today’s “system of shared ad-
judication between agencies and Article III courts.”54 Against 
this current of same-source concurrence, two excellent recent 
works of scholarship—one by Professor James Pfander in the 
Harvard Law Review, the other by Professor Caleb Nelson in 
the Columbia Law Review—aim to revive Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s same-effect concurrence.55 Both of these sophisticated 
articles aim to establish that non-Article III tribunals are con-
stitutional because they do not exercise Article III judicial pow-
er, but, instead, exercise some other power.56  
A similar battle between same-effect and same-source con-
currence appears in the nondelegation context. Undertaking an 
approach structurally identical to Professors Pfander and Nel-
son, Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule conclude that 
the powers exercised by agencies are fully constitutional be-
cause agencies never exercise Article I legislative powers.57 
Posner and Vermeule acknowledge that agency rulemaking 
may be functionally equivalent to lawmaking so far as the citi-
zen is concerned, but they claim that agency rulemaking cannot 
constitute an exercise of legislative power because legislative 
power refers only to the power to enact statutes.58 Professor 
Merrill, by contrast, argues on behalf of same-source concur-
rence: Merrill criticizes Posner and Vermeule’s idiosyncratical-
 
 52. See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828); see also 
infra Part II.C (discussing Canter fully). 
 53. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 
(1986). 
 54. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 873 (emphasis added). 
 55. See Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 559, 565 (2007); Pfander, supra note 22, at 775. 
 56. See Nelson, supra note 55, at 564–65 (concluding that “core private 
rights” can only be adjudicated in Article III courts, and that non-Article III 
courts adjudicate other matters); Pfander, supra note 22, at 650–51 (arguing 
that what typically are called “Article I courts” actually have the status of non-
Article III “tribunals” that cannot exercise federal judicial power).  
 57. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doc-
trine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1756 (2002). 
 58. See id. at 1746, 1756. 
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ly narrow definition of “legislative power”59 and concludes that 
the power exercised by agencies indeed constitutes legislative 
power.60  
As a formal matter, contemporary case law treats agency 
powers as an aspect of same-effect concurrence, insisting that 
Article I’s “text permits no delegation of those [legislative] pow-
ers.”61 Justices Stevens and Souter reject this same-effect ac-
count of agency power and, instead, embrace same-source con-
currence; they have criticized the Court for “pretend[ing] 
. . . that the authority delegated” to an administrative agency 
“is somehow not ‘legislative power,’” advocating instead that “it 
would be both wiser and more faithful to what we have actually 
done in delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking au-
thority is ‘legislative power.’”62  
iii. Reexamining the Reasons for the Distinction 
Two justifications underlie the claim that the distinction 
between same-source and same-effect concurrence is signifi-
cant. 
First, same-effect concurrence is thought to be acceptable 
on the ground that there is nothing inherently problematic for 
two institutions with different sources of power to have powers 
that overlap.63 For example, it is utterly uncontroversial that 
both federal courts (which receive their power from Article III 
of the Constitution and federal statutes) and state courts 
(which receive their powers from state constitutions and state 
legislation) have the power to adjudicate contract disputes of 
more than $75,000 between citizens of two different states.  
 
 59. Merrill, supra note 50, at 2125 (noting that “[t]here is no support in 
decisional law for” Posner’s and Vermeule’s formal definition of legislative 
power as the power to enact statutes, and that their definition “is at the very 
least idiosyncratic, and probably would be rejected if presented to the courts”). 
 60. See id. at 2165 (arguing that “the nondelegation doctrine . . . should be 
rejected” and that “the Court should repudiate the idea that Article I, Sec-
tion 1 precludes any congressional sharing of legislative power” (emphasis 
added)). 
 61. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). 
 62. Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985 (1983) 
(White, J., dissenting) (adopting a similar approach and explaining that “by 
virtue of congressional delegation, legislative power can be exercised by inde-
pendent agencies and Executive departments without the passage of new leg-
islation”). 
 63. See Nelson, supra note 55, at 561. 
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There is force to this first reason, but it has limits. As a de-
scriptive matter, same-effect concurrence has not been immune 
to sharp criticism. For example, Madison’s words in Helvidius 
Number II—reproduced, in part, in this Article’s opening para-
graph and fully analyzed in Part I.D—were penned as an ar-
gument against same-effect concurrence: Madison argued that 
Congress had power to interpret a mutual defense treaty under 
its powers to declare war and that the President, accordingly, 
did not have power to interpret the treaty under any of his con-
stitutional powers.64 Similarly, the recent battle between Pro-
fessors Ackerman and Golove, on the one hand, and Professor 
Tribe, on the other, with respect to the constitutionality of con-
gressional-executive agreements, concerned the legitimacy of 
same-effect concurrence.65 Neither the defenders nor the critics 
suggested that congressional-executive agreements were based 
on the treaty power. Rather, the debates centered on whether a 
power to create congressional-executive agreements premised 
on Congress’s Article I powers can coexist with the treaty pow-
er—in other words, the constitutionality of same-effect concur-
rence.66 
The Pacificus-Helvidius debates and the dispute surround-
ing congressional-executive agreements prove that same-effect 
concurrence is not immune from controversy. But, one might 
ask, why should same-effect concurrence ever be controversial? 
Two answers suggest themselves. First, the activity in question 
may appear to more readily fit under one of the two powers, 
opening the door to arguments based on expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius67 and raising fears that some troublesome exten-
sion of governmental power is at work.68 Second, if two or more 
institutions have the power to do X, then it is possible that the 
institutions will decide to act differently and thereby create a 
conflict.69 For reasons explained later, neither of these objec-
tions is an adequate basis for flatly rejecting same-effect con-
 
 64. MADISON, supra note 1, at 67. 
 65. Compare Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 803, with Laurence H. 
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method 
in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1275 (1995). 
 66. See supra note 65. 
 67. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 65, at 1241–43. For an examination of this 
canon, see infra Part I.C.2. 
 68. This is the core of Professor Tribe’s sharp critique of congressional-
executive agreements. See Tribe, supra note 65, at 1302–03. 
 69. This concern permeates Madison’s discussion. See MADISON, supra 
note 1, at 66–69. 
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currence,70 though they do explain why same-effect concurrence 
can legitimately be controversial. 
The second reason cited for drawing a sharp line between 
same-source and same-effect concurrence is that same-source 
concurrence sometimes is said to render the Constitution “mere 
surplusage.”71 To provide two examples: if the Constitution 
goes out of its way to provide special protections for those who 
exercise the judicial power (life tenure and salary guaran-
tees),72 how can the same judicial power be exercised by judges 
lacking such protections? And, if the Constitution provides spe-
cial procedures that must be followed for legislation to be 
enacted,73 how can the same legislative power be exercised by 
different institutions and different procedures? To put the mat-
ter a bit differently, allowing judicial power to be exercised out-
side of Article III courts or the legislative power to be exercised 
outside of Congress could be said to sanction an end-run 
around the Constitution’s specifications. This is yet another 
way of saying that same-source concurrence violates the canon 
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.  
There are two strong counterarguments to this second con-
cern. First, there is a plausible textual argument that the Con-
stitution generally permits the delegations of power that give 
rise to same-source concurrence. This can be seen by generaliz-
ing the arguments that have been separately made by Profes-
sors Thomas Merrill and Cass Sunstein in the nondelegation 
context. Merrill argues that agencies properly exercise actual 
legislative power,74 thereby forthrightly defending same-source 
concurrence. Merrill’s argument demonstrates that the Consti-
tution’s text almost always can be plausibly construed to per-
mit concurrence, even when the Constitution allocates power to 
only one institution. After all, one might think that Article I, 
Section 1 provides a particularly strong textual basis for em-
bracing exclusivity as regards legislative power: its language 
that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress” quite plausibly could be said to require that all legis-
lative power vests only in Congress.75 Yet Merrill resists this 
 
 70. See infra Part IV (discussing all or nothing), infra Part V (discussing 
conflicts). 
 71. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
 72. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 73. See id. art. I, § 7. 
 74. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 2127. 
 75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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conclusion because the “text of the Constitution is .  .  .  silent on 
the question whether or to what extent legislative power may 
be shared.”76 Cass Sunstein has made the same argument: “The 
Constitution does grant legislative power to Congress, but it 
does not in terms forbid delegations of that power.”77  
Merrill’s and Sunstein’s arguments can be generalized 
beyond the nondelegation context because, with only a handful 
of exceptions,78 the Constitution’s grants of power are not ac-
companied by prohibitions on the delegation of the allocated 
power.79 It follows that the constitutional text almost never fo-
recloses delegations that can result in what Merrill calls 
“shared” power80 and what this Article dubs “same-source con-
currence.”81 
At their core, Merrill’s and Sunstein’s arguments consti-
tute a rejection of a categorical application of expressio unius 
 
 76. Merrill, supra note 50, at 2127; cf. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 
748, 776 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting a nondelegation challenge on 
the ground that the Constitution “does not set forth any special limitation on 
Congress’s assigning to the President the task of implementing the laws 
enacted pursuant to [Congress’s powers to make rules for the land and naval 
forces]”). 
 77. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 
(2000) (emphasis added). 
 78. The sole exceptions can be found in Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of 
the Constitution, which specifies a handful of actions (such as entering into 
treaties and coining money) that federal institutions may undertake but that 
states may not. That the activities identified in Clause 1 are flatly prohibited 
to states, and may not be delegated to states, is all but impossible to deny on 
account of the Constitution’s next two clauses, which specify activities that 
states shall not do “without the Consent of the Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1–3. 
 79. For an extended critique of delegation, see Alexander & Prakash, su-
pra note 18. 
 80. Merrill, supra note 50, at 2116. Furthermore, Merrill appears to be of 
the view that there sometimes can be “shared” powers even without delega-
tion. Merrill believes that institutions apart from Congress have no inherent 
legislative power (the “anti-inherency principle,” id. at 2101), and that there 
accordingly can be shared legislative powers only pursuant to congressional 
delegations, on account of Article I, Section 1’s specification that the legislative 
powers “herein” granted are vested in Congress. See id. (“[T]he reference to 
legislative powers ‘herein’ granted can be understood to limit the anti-
inherency principle to those powers granted in Article I itself.”). This suggests 
that legislative powers granted to Congress outside of Article I (perhaps, for 
instance, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment) may be shared by 
institutions apart from Congress even without a delegation from Congress. 
 81. Indeed, the broad implications of Merrill’s argument vis-à-vis delega-
tions of other powers led Larry Alexander and Sai Prakash to pen something 
of a slippery slope discourse. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 18. I re-
spond to their argument in Part IV. 
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est exclusio alterius.82 Specifically, their arguments assume 
that constitutional specification alone (i.e., absent an express 
statement of nondelegation) does not mean that only the speci-
fied institution may undertake the activity in question. I revisit 
(and defend) this proposition later in Part VI after canvassing 
the degree of concurrence present in contemporary American 
constitutional law. For now, though, it is important to note the 
dangers that are entailed by their (and my) position. While it is 
true that the Constitution generally does not contain antidele-
gation provisions, construing this as a general license to dele-
gate could be criticized as opening the door to wholesale eva-
sion of the Constitution’s carefully crafted mechanisms.83 After 
all, delegation (almost) always substitutes a less demanding 
procedure for accomplishing X than what the Constitution spe-
cifies; indeed, this is typically the motivation behind concur-
rence. For example, congressional-executive agreements are 
pursued because there is insufficient senatorial support for a 
treaty, and territorial courts rather than Article III courts were 
created so that their judges did not have to have life tenure.84 I 
acknowledge these concerns and dangers but, for reasons ex-
plained in Part IV, I reject the suggestion that they are appro-
priately addressed by adopting a categorical canon of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius. 
The second counterargument is that the “mere surplusage” 
concerns discussed above are not addressed simply by showing 
that an institutional arrangement is an instance of same-effect 
rather than same-source concurrence. On this second approach, 
the only way to give life to the canon of expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius, and the only way to ensure that the Constitu-
tion’s language is not made “mere surplusage,” is to conclude 
that same-effect concurrence is also impermissible. For in-
stance, how are the concerns articulated above ameliorated by 
concluding that territorial courts exercise Article I rather than 
Article III power?  
There are three plausible responses to the second counter-
argument. The first is to reject it by concluding that it does 
make a constitutional difference as to whether Article I courts 
exercise Article III judicial power or something else. On this 
 
 82. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 2101–02; Sunstein, supra note 77, at 
322. 
 83. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 18, at 1036–39. 
 84. For an in-depth discussion of this point, see Glidden Co. v. Zdanock, 
370 U.S. 530, 544–45 (1962); see also infra Part III.B.1 (discussing Glidden). 
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view, the distinction between same-source and same-effect con-
currence remains important, and only same-effect concurrence 
is permissible. This type of rationale is more likely to be com-
pelling to formalists than to functionalists.  
Responses two and three are likely to appeal to functional-
ists. The second response is that the “mere surplusage” con-
cerns only can be addressed by rejecting all forms of concur-
rence, and to conclude accordingly that only exclusivity is 
permissible. The third response—diametrically opposed to the 
second—is to conclude that sometimes constitutional provisions 
are effectively rendered “mere surplusage” and to then conclude 
that both same-effect and same-source concurrence are poten-
tially permissible. For those functionalists to whom either res-
ponses two or three are appealing, the actual practice of Ameri-
can constitutional law is likely to be relevant in deciding 
between the two possibilities. For this reason, I shall delay fur-
ther consideration of this question, and instead will proceed 
with a survey of concurrence in American law. 
To conclude, it is not necessary for present purposes to ful-
ly settle the question of whether and to what extent the distinc-
tion between same-source and same-effect concurrence matters. 
What does matter, however, are the following two conclusions: 
(1) the distinction may matter to some, and for these people 
some forms of concurrence are constitutionally permissible; and 
(2) whether concurrence is permissible to those who think that 
the distinction is not significant likely turns, at least in part, on 
past and contemporary practice.  
b. Nonidenticality 
A second principle relevant to this Article’s analysis is that 
concurrence does not mean that the two institutions’ acts are 
wholly identical. This “nonidenticality principle” is true of both 
same-source and same-effect concurrence. In general, the acts 
of institutions with concurrent power are nonidentical with re-
gard to both (1) what must happen to effectuate the act and (2) 
what must happen to negate the act. There sometimes are ad-
ditional distinctions between the “concurrent” acts. For in-
stance, administrative regulations are not identical to sta-
tutes.85 Though they share much in common—for instance, 
 
 85. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with 
the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 477–78 
(2002) (“Legislative rules . . . have the force and effect of law . . . akin to that of 
a statute. Nonlegislative rules do not have the force and effect of law; rather, 
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from the vantage point of most citizens, the legal obligations 
they impose are indistinguishable—administrative regulations 
do not appear in United States Statutes at Large, they are 
brought into existence by the actions of two different institu-
tions (Congress or an agency), and they typically are easier to 
amend or rescind than statutes.86 Consider, as well, the rela-
tion between actual constitutional amendments and what popu-
larly are called judicial amendments by the Court. The latter 
might be less permanent than formal Article V amendments 
since they can be reversed by a simple majority of Supreme 
Court Justices.87  
c. Imperfect Overlap 
A third relevant principle is that concurrence does not nec-
essarily entail perfect overlap between the powers of the two 
institutions.88 To the contrary, there typically is imperfect over-
lap between the two.89 For example, the early twentieth cen-
tury case of Missouri v. Holland established that treaties “may 
deal with a subject that Congress could not regulate by legisla-
tion in the absence of treaty.”90 Though the scope of Congress’s 
powers has significantly expanded since the twentieth cen-
tury,91 there still might be some subjects relating to interna-
 
they are simply statements about what an agency intends to do in the fu-
ture.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitutive and Entrenchment Func-
tions of Constitutions: A Research Agenda, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 399, 409 
(2008) (“Statutes are certainly harder to amend than administrative regula-
tions . . . .”). 
 87. Cf. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 155 (1903) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (discussing the dangers associated with judicial amendments). 
 88. See Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating the Commander in Chief: Some 
Theories, 81 IND. L.J. 1319, 1320 (2006) (discussing the overlap, or lack there-
of, between the powers of Congress and the President as Commander-in-
Chief ). 
 89. See id. at 1321 (“It is possible to suppose that the two powers overlap 
in some ways, but that each also has an exclusive sphere.” (footnote omitted)). 
 90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. c (1986) (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 
(1920)).  
 91. Indeed, the subject addressed in Holland that was then viewed as fall-
ing outside the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers today could be 
regulated under the Commerce Clause. See Judith Resnik, The International-
ism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 1105, 1117 
(2008) (“Missouri v. Holland is famous (and contested) today for the proposi-
tion that the Senate can use its treaty power to do what is otherwise beyond 
its power, but within a few decades after the opinion was issued, . . . Con-
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tional relations that do not fall within Congress’s enumerated 
powers. Accordingly, there is imperfect overlap between the 
treaty power and congressional-executive agreements. 
2. Concurrence’s Relation to Three Familiar Constitutional 
Principles 
Three familiar concepts in constitutional law might be 
thought to have some connection to concurrence: checks and 
balances, the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and 
enumerated powers. 
a. Checks and Balances 
To begin, “concurrence” and “checks and balances” are dis-
tinct concepts. Whereas “concurrence” refers to the situation 
where two (or more) different institutions each have the power 
to undertake X, “checks and balances” refers to the situation 
where two (or more) institutions have distinctive roles in com-
pleting act X. So, for instance, the President’s veto power is an 
aspect of checks and balances, but is not an example of concur-
rence.92 The same is true of the Senate’s role in approving ap-
pointments of officers.93  
b. Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius 
Second, consider the canon of constitutional construction 
known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or “to express or 
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.”94 Here 
there indeed is a tension. Concurrence—in many of its forms—
is orthogonally opposed to expressio unius. The tension is keen 
with same-source concurrence. When the Constitution allocates 
federal judicial power to Article III courts, application of the 
canon of expressio unius would mean that only federal courts 
can exercise that power. The Court’s conclusion that Congress 
may “authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-
 
gress’s powers under the Commerce Clause had been reconceived to be capa-
cious.” (footnote omitted)). 
 92. See Arthur A. Rizer III, The Filibuster of Judicial Nominations: Con-
stitutional Crisis or Politics as Usual?, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 847, 866 (2005) (“The 
President’s veto is one of the most significant powers in the ‘checks and bal-
ances’ form of government.”). 
 93. Madison draws a similar distinction in the Helvidius Number II. See 
MADISON, supra note 1, at 68 (“In executive acts, the legislature, or at least a 
branch of it, may participate, as in the appointment to offices.”). 
 94. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009). 
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Article III tribunal”95 reflects a decision not to invoke the ca-
non. That expressio unius was not invoked is not particularly 
troubling or surprising—at least since the time of Karl Lle-
welyn it has been widely understood that canons of interpreta-
tion are selectively invoked.96 Yet it is important to recognize it. 
Among other things, understanding when a canon is invoked—
and when it is not—is crucial to recognizing the canon’s true 
strength.  
Expressio unius also is inconsistent with many instances of 
same-effect concurrence. For example, under the canon, the 
Constitution’s allocation of the pardon power to the President 
would mean that Congress does not have a functionally identic-
al power to issue immunities under the Commerce Clause.97 
The Court, however, has held that Congress does have such a 
power (Example 3 in Part I.B, above)—against a dissent sound-
ing in expressio unius in its insistence that “Congress cannot 
grant a pardon” because pardons are “the sole prerogative of 
the President to grant.”98 On the other hand, expressio unius is 
not implicated in the circumstance of same-effect concurrence 
that arises where both institutions claim authorization from 
only very general power grants. In that circumstance, there is 
no expressio unius. 
There is one other type of concurrence that also is not in-
consistent with expressio unius. As explained later,99 concur-
rence frequently is created when the institution with the power 
to do X delegates some of that power to another institution—
consider in this regard Congress’s grant of rulemaking power to 
agencies (Example 5 in Part I.B, above). Expressio unius, on its 
own, is not inconsistent with the constitutionally empowered 
institution’s delegation of some power. At most, an antidelega-
tion rule is a plausible, but by no means inevitable, inference 
from the principle of expressio unius. 
 
 95. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 
(1986). 
 96. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision 
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. 
REV. 395, 401–06 (1950).  
 97. Consider as well congressional-executive agreements (Example 4, su-
pra Part I.B). The Constitution’s specification that international obligations be 
created via the treaty would be most naturally interpreted, upon application of 
expressio unius, that international obligations cannot be made pursuant to 
other more general grants of congressional power (such as the power to regu-
late foreign commerce). 
 98. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 638 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 99. See infra Part III.A.1. 
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The short of it is this: much of the time, though not always, 
concurrence reflects a context-specific repudiation of the canon 
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. I return to a fuller con-
sideration of the constitutional implications of this point in 
Part VI. 
c. Enumerated Powers 
Concurrence bears a subtle relation to the concept of enu-
merated powers. “Enumerated powers” typically is understood 
to mean that the federal government is a government of only 
the limited powers spelled out in the Constitution.100 On the 
one hand, it might be thought that concurrence bears no rela-
tion to enumerated powers; whether the powers given to the 
federal government are exercisable exclusively or concurrently 
bears no relation to the concept of enumerated powers so long 
as the powers indeed were enumerated. 
On the other hand, concurrence that is created by delega-
tion can be said to implicate enumerated powers when the de-
legatee is more readily able to exercise the power than the de-
legator. For instance, enumerated powers may not only mean 
that the federal government can regulate interstate commerce, 
but also that the federal government was given the power to 
regulate interstate commerce only by means of the specific pro-
cedure laid down in Article I.101 On this view, the fact that it is 
difficult to enact legislation, and that Congress could not have 
generated all the rules found in the Federal Register, would 
mean that the proliferation of federal regulations made possible 
by Congress’s rulemaking delegations represents a breach of 
the concept of enumerated powers, even if congressional power 
extends to each and every regulation enacted by an agency.  
It is advisable to fully analyze enumerated powers after 
having comprehensively examined the phenomenon of concur-
rence. I accordingly return to this topic in Part VI. 
D. THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES 
The earliest debate concerning the choice between exclusiv-
ity and concurrence—and, perhaps surprisingly, still the most 
extended discussion of this issue to date—is found in the ex-
 
 100. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Every law 
enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated 
in the Constitution.”). 
 101. For an extensive development of this line of argumentation in relation 
to sole executive agreements, see generally Clark, supra note 32. 
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change between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison 
known as the Pacificus-Helvidius debates. The occasion for the 
debates was President Washington’s issuance of the Neutrality 
Proclamation of 1793.102 In declaring the new nation’s neutrali-
ty vis-à-vis France’s war with Great Britain and Holland, Pres-
ident Washington’s Proclamation interpreted the 1778 Treaty 
of Alliance with France.103 
The question dividing Hamilton and Madison was whether 
the President had constitutional authority to interpret the 
Treaty. Madison, writing under the name “Helvidius” and us-
ing the words reproduced in this Article’s first paragraph, took 
the exclusivist position, arguing that only Congress had power 
to interpret the Treaty on account of its power to declare war. 
Writing under the pseudonym of “Pacificus,” Hamilton de-
fended the Proclamation’s legality, adopting what this Article 
dubs “concurrence” in arguing that both the President and 
Congress had power to interpret the Treaty.104 
Hamilton acknowledged that Congress had the power to 
interpret the Treaty pursuant to its power to declare war, but 
urged that the President also had the power to interpret the 
Treaty under the President’s executive powers: 
[H]owever true it may be, that th〈e〉 right of the Legislature to declare 
wa〈r〉 includes the right of judging whether the N〈ation〉 be under ob-
ligations to make War or not—it will not follow that the Executive is 
in any case excluded from a similar right of Judgment, in the execu-
tion of its own functions.105 
This is a defense of same-effect concurrence insofar as Hamil-
ton believed that the source of the President’s power to issue 
the Proclamation was the Vesting Clause106 and that Con-
gress’s interpretive powers derived from the Declare War 
Clause.107  
 
 102. For a good introduction, see Morton J. Frisch, Introduction to THE PA-
CIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794, supra note 1, at vii, vii.  
 103. See id. 
 104. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, PACIFICUS NUMBER I, reprinted in THE 
PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794, supra note 1, at 13. 
 105. See id. (emphasis added). 
 106. See id. at 16. Though this construction of the Vesting Clause was con-
troversial then and remains disputed today, that issue is not relevant to this 
Article’s concern of whether power is allocated on an exclusive or concurrent 
basis.  
 107. Hamilton’s understanding of concurrence was not tied to his view of 
the Vesting Clause as shown by the fact that he presents a hypothetical in 
which the President interprets a treaty pursuant to his powers under the Rec-
ognition Clause and Congress also has the power under the Declare War 
Clause to interpret the treaty. Hamilton fully understood the import of his ar-
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Madison vehemently disagreed with Hamilton’s embrace of 
concurrence, dedicating the bulk of his Helvidius Number II to 
disputing it. His position boils down to two arguments. First, 
Madison claims to identify a “material error” in Hamilton’s po-
sition insofar as (Madison claims) Hamilton failed to fully apply 
his own principles: 
  He had before admitted that the right to declare war . . . includes 
the right to judge whether the United States be obliged to declare war 
or not. Can the inference be avoided, that the executive instead of hav-
ing a similar right to judge, is as much excluded from the right to 
judge as from the right to declare?108 
Madison says that the “inference” (that the President can nei-
ther interpret the Treaty nor declare war) cannot be avoided, 
but why not? Madison does not further explain his position. His 
argument, it would seem, boils down to ipse dixit assertion of 
exclusivity—which does not amount to an argument at all inso-
far as it is the very principle he aims to establish. Two para-
graphs later Madison tries again to drive home the same point, 
but with no greater success. Madison asserts that Hamilton:  
[C]annot disentangle himself by considering the right of the executive 
to judge as concurrent with that of the legislature. For if the executive 
have a concurrent right to judge, and the right to judge be included in 
(it is in fact the very essence of ) the right to declare, he must go on 
and say that the executive has a concurrent right also to declare.109 
But why is this so if, as Hamilton hypothesized, the President’s 
right to interpret the Treaty derives from an independent pres-
idential power? Under Hamilton’s approach, after all, it is per-
fectly conceivable that an independent presidential power could 
encompass the “right to judge” but not the “right to declare.”110 
For this reason, Madison’s argument here is wholly unavailing.  
Madison’s second justification for opposing concurrence is 
more substantive. The trouble with concurrence, he rightly ob-
serves, is that it opens the door to conflicts: 
  If the legislature and executive have both a right to judge of the 
obligations to make war or not, it must sometimes happen . . . that 
they will judge differently. . . .  
  . . . .  
 
gument—that two institutions could have the power to undertake the same 
act—and Hamilton in fact adopted virtually the same term that this Article 
uses, writing that “there results . . . a concurrent authority” as between the 
President and Congress. See id. at 15. 
 108. MADISON, supra note 1, at 66 (emphasis added).  
 109. Id. (second emphasis added). 
 110. Id. 
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  In what light does this present the constitution to the people who 
established it? In what light would it present to the world, a nation, 
thus speaking, thro’ two different organs, equally constitutional and 
authentic, two opposite languages, on the same subject and under the 
same existing circumstances?111 
Hamilton had a response to Madison’s argument that I dis-
cuss in Part V,112 which examines six different mechanisms 
found in American law for resolving conflicts among institu-
tions with overlapping power. As will be shown, Hamilton’s re-
sponse tracks one of the six mechanisms. 
* * * * * 
Having defined “concurrence” and “exclusivity” and intro-
duced the concepts of same-source concurrence, same-effect 
concurrence, nonidenticality, and imperfect overlap, we are 
ready to proceed to examine many intriguing patterns. 
II.  THE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY FROM EXCLUSIVITY 
TO CONCURRENCE   
A study of Supreme Court case law reveals the tenacity of 
exclusivist assumptions. The judiciary virtually always adopts 
exclusivist assumptions and opposes claims that power can be 
concurrently exercised. Though the Court generally has come to 
acknowledge concurrence, judicial acceptance has not initiated 
the concurrent exercise of power but instead has been a belated 
recognition of a widespread practice that has taken root outside 
the courtroom.113 In some other contexts, the Court has created 
doctrines that formally cling to exclusivity notwithstanding the 
fact that virtually all scholars acknowledge that two institu-
tions exercise concurrent powers.114  
The bottom line is that there is a clear trajectory in both 
practice and doctrine: initial exclusivist assumptions consis-
tently, though not universally, have given way to concur-
 
 111. Id. at 69. 
 112. See infra Part V.B. 
 113. In other words, there has been an “interaction between the courts and 
the political branches in the creation of constitutional meaning.” Mark Tush-
net, Constitutional Interpretation Outside the Courts, 37 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 
415, 418 (2007). See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
STRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999). Though 
Tushnet’s words are directed to early nineteenth-century events, this Article 
shows that the same phenomenon has continued up to the present. 
 114. See infra Part II.D. 
  
2010] FROM EXCLUSIVITY TO CONCURRENCE 1077 
 
rence.115 On the other hand, as Part II.H documents, there are 
many contexts where exclusivist assumptions have been un-
challenged, and at least one instance of a partial countertrajec-
tory where the Supreme Court has cut back on concurrence and 
turned back to exclusivity.  
A. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE VARIOUS FEDERAL COURTS: 
THE ROAD FROM MARBURY TO AMES 
The substantive constitutional issue raised in Marbury v. 
Madison116 is both an early illustration of the choice between 
exclusivity or concurrence and an exemplar of the Court’s ini-
tial approach to answering the query. The Constitution pro-
vides that “[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a 
Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In 
all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall 
have appellate Jurisdiction.”117 The (still to be created) inferior 
federal courts and/or state courts had original jurisdiction over 
other matters that fell within the scope of Article III’s judicial 
power. 
The substantive question famously presented in Marbury 
was whether Congress could expand the Supreme Court’s orig-
inal jurisdiction beyond the three categories enumerated in the 
Constitution.118 The issue raised in the case clearly fell within 
the “judicial Power of the United States,”119 and the case itself 
clearly fell within the original jurisdiction of the inferior courts 
that Congress had established. This is the respect in which 
Marbury presented the Court with the choice between exclusiv-
ity and concurrence: Marbury presented the question of wheth-
er the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction could be made to 
overlap with the inferior federal courts’ original jurisdiction.  
The Marbury Court specifically considered the question of 
whether Congress could “assign original jurisdiction to [the Su-
preme Court] in other cases than those specified in” the Consti-
 
 115. See Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
781, 790 (2008) (discussing the “general trajectory” away from exclusivity to 
concurrence). 
 116. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 117. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 118. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175. 
 119. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The issue in the case concerned a question of 
federal law: the legal effect of a commission for public justice that the Presi-
dent had signed after the Senate’s advice and consent. 
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tution.120 The Court rejected this proposition, explaining: “Af-
firmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other 
objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or ex-
clusive sense must be given to them, or they have no operation 
at all.”121 As others have noted, Chief Justice Marshall’s rea-
soning here is an example of expressio unius est exclusio alte-
rius122: from the fact that the Constitution “apportion[ed] the 
judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts,”123 
Marshall concluded that only the institution that had been con-
stitutionally allocated original jurisdiction could exercise origi-
nal jurisdiction.124 Any other interpretation would render the 
Constitution’s language “mere surplusage.”125 Chief Justice 
Marshall’s chief justification for Marbury’s substantive holding 
accordingly was an exclusivist argument.  
My intention here is not to suggest that the Court incor-
rectly decided this portion of Marbury,126 but instead to show 
that its exclusivist justification has not fared well. Consider in 
this regard the Court’s decision in Ames v. Kansas.127 Kansas 
had sued several corporations in Kansas state courts, and de-
fendants had removed to an inferior federal court in reliance on 
the federal question statute, which granted inferior federal 
courts jurisdiction over cases raising questions of federal law.128 
At issue in Ames was the constitutionality of the federal ques-
tion statute’s application to a case in which a state was a party: 
could Congress assign original jurisdiction to an inferior federal 
 
 120. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Tribe, supra note 65, at 1275. 
 123. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. 
 126. Indeed, there was strong constitutional language on which the Chief 
Justice could have relied. After enumerating the cases in which the Supreme 
Court is to have original jurisdiction, Article III provides that “[i]n all the oth-
er cases . . . , the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Extending the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction to include mandamus correspondingly diminishes its appellate ju-
risdiction and hence could be said to run afoul of this constitutional language. 
On the other hand, the very last phrase of the above sentence from Article III 
appears to grant Congress the power to make “Exceptions” to the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Id. For a collection of sources that examine 
these competing textual arguments, see James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original 
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1515, 1517 & n.5 (2001). 
 127. 111 U.S. 449 (1884). 
 128. See id. at 462–63. 
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court given the fact that the Constitution granted the Supreme 
Court “original Jurisdiction” in “all Cases . . . in which a State 
shall be Party”?129  
The Court in Ames acknowledged that Marbury “used lan-
guage . . . which might, perhaps, imply that such original juris-
diction as had been granted by the Constitution was exclu-
sive.”130 On this approach, the Supreme Court alone (among 
federal courts) would have had original jurisdiction over cases 
such as this in which a state was a party. 
But Ames rejected Marbury’s approach and upheld Con-
gress’s power to grant inferior courts original jurisdiction over 
the same subjects that fall within the Supreme Court’s consti-
tutionally granted original jurisdiction.131 Instead of Marbury’s 
exclusivity, Ames reasoned as follows:  
[T]he grant of jurisdiction over a certain subject matter to one court 
does not, of itself, imply that that jurisdiction is to be exclusive. In the 
clause in question [in the Constitution] there is nothing but mere af-
firmative words of grant, and none that import a design to exclude the 
subordinate jurisdiction of other courts of the United States on the 
same subject matter.132 
The italicized language, it should be noted, is precisely the 
same type of argument that Professors Merrill and Sunstein 
have made in defense of Congress’s powers to delegate legisla-
tive authority to agencies.133 
Three important lessons emerge from considering the rela-
tionship between Ames’s rationale and Marbury’s reasoning. 
First, the two are at loggerheads. Marbury instructs that the 
Constitution’s grants of power are conclusively presumed to be 
exclusive. Otherwise, said Chief Justice Marshall, the Consti-
tution’s language would be “mere surplusage.”134 Ames, by con-
trast, strips any presumption of exclusivity from the Constitu-
tion’s grant of power to a particular institution.  
Second, insofar as much of the Constitution’s text consists 
of affirmative grants of power to particular institutions, the in-
 
 129. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 130. Ames, 111 U.S. at 467. 
 131. See id. at 447 (“[W]e are unable to say that it is not within the power 
of Congress to grant to the inferior courts of the United States jurisdiction in 
cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by the constitution with orig-
inal jurisdiction.”). 
 132. Id. at 468 (quoting Gittings v. Crawford, 10 F. Cas. 447, 450 (C.C.D. 
Md. 1838) (No. 5465) (emphasis added)). 
 133. See supra Part I.C.1.a. 
 134. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
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terpretive question that both Marbury and Ames address—
whether the Constitution’s affirmative grant of power is to be 
construed as a constitutional mandate that only that institu-
tion has the specified power—is pervasive.  
Third, and finally, Ames’s and Marbury’s contrary resolu-
tions to the interpretive question strongly suggest that consti-
tutional text alone does not answer the question of whether 
constitutional grants are exclusive. How then is the decision to 
be made as to whether the Constitution’s power grants are ex-
clusive or potentially concurrent? This important question will 
be taken up in Part III. 
B. FACT-FINDING IN CIVIL ADJUDICATION: OF JURIES, JUDGES, 
AND NON-ARTICLE III ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS  
The Seventh Amendment allocates power to juries, grant-
ing them the power to “tr[y] . . . fact[s] . . . [i]n Suits at common 
law.”135 The Seventh Amendment simultaneously limits the 
power of federal judges, providing that courts are not permitted 
to reexamine the jury’s findings “otherwise . . . than according 
to the rules of the common law.”136 The Court long has held 
that “common law” for these purposes refers to the procedures 
for reexamining jury verdicts that were available in English 
common law in 1791, when the Seventh Amendment was 
adopted.137  
This subpart examines how an exclusivist regime in which 
only juries had the power to find facts was transformed into a 
system of concurrence in which adjudicatory fact-finding au-
thority is held jointly by juries, Article III judges, and judges in 
non-Article III courts. Subpart 1 examines the trajectory from 
exclusivity to concurrence as between juries and Article III 
judges. To this day, the Court has been reluctant to formally 
acknowledge the concurrence that exists. Subpart 2 examines 
the trajectory from exclusivity to concurrence as between juries 
and Article I tribunals, where a different story appears: after 
initially denying and thereafter seeking to tightly cabin concur-
 
 135. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 435–36, 
& 436 n.20 (1996). While riding circuit, Justice Story was among the first of 
the American jurists to equate the Seventh Amendment’s language of “com-
mon law” with the “common law of England.” United States v. Wonson, 28 F. 
Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750); see also Slocum v. N.Y. Life 
Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377 (1913) (quoting approvingly this language from 
Justice Story’s Wonson opinion). 
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rence, the Court ultimately came to frankly acknowledge the 
existence of significant concurrence. 
1. Juries and Judges 
Professor Suja Thomas has shown that English common 
law as of 1791 adopted what this Article dubs an “exclusivist” 
allocation of duties in which only the jury, not the judge, had 
the power to find facts.138 Early American jurisprudence 
tracked England’s exclusivist approach to dividing power be-
tween judge and jury. The early twentieth-century case of Slo-
cum v. New York Life Insurance Co.139 and the cases on which it 
relied are representative. Before 1938, a federal statute di-
rected federal courts to apply state procedural rules in diversity 
suits.140 Pennsylvania law at the time of the Slocum decision 
permitted what today would be called judgment as a matter of 
law: Pennsylvania procedure authorized judges to disregard a 
jury’s verdict for insufficient evidence and instead to directly 
 
 138. See Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 
VA. L. REV. 139, 143 (2007) (showing that only “the jury or the parties deter-
mined the facts,” not the judge, under English common law at the time of 
1791). Under three common law procedures, neither the judge nor jury found 
facts: instead, the parties stipulated to the facts (the “demurrer to the plead-
ings,” the “demurrer to the evidence,” and the “special case” under the parties’ 
agreement as to the facts), and the judge thereafter applied the law to the sti-
pulated facts. See id. at 148–54, 156–57. Under the demurrer to the pleadings 
and demurrer to the evidence, one party admitted to the facts alleged by the 
other party (the former after the pleadings had been filed, the latter during 
the trial itself ). See id. at 148–54. Under the special case, the parties could 
jointly stipulate to specific facts. See id. at 156–57. Under the other common 
law procedures, the jury’s finding of facts provided the ground for the case’s 
outcome. In the special case following a jury’s general verdict, the court de-
cided a disputed question of law but used the jury’s findings of fact. Common 
law courts could grant motions for a new trial on the ground that the evidence 
did not support the jury’s verdict, but the result was a new trial during which 
time a (new) jury would find the facts. See id. at 157–58. Finally, under a com-
pulsory nonsuit, a common law court could enter judgment for a defendant fol-
lowing jury verdict for plaintiff, but “only if the jury’s verdict was unsupported 
as to a particular matter of law.” Id. at 155. Of particular relevance to the dis-
cussion above, insufficient evidence was not a basis for a compulsory nonsuit. 
See id.  
 139. 228 U.S. at 382 (“To the [court] is committed a power of direction and 
superintendence, and to the [jury] the ultimate determination of the issues of 
fact. Only through the coöperation of the two, each acting within its appropri-
ate sphere, can the constitutional right be satisfied.”). 
 140. See Practice Conformity Act, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872). For 
a discussion, see Ellen E. Sward, The Seventh Amendment and the Alchemy of 
Fact and Law, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 583 & n.63 (2003). 
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enter judgment for the other party.141 The Slocum Court ruled 
that this procedure, when applied by federal courts, violated 
the Seventh Amendment.142 The problem was not that the fed-
eral court had set aside the verdict, for procedures available 
under the common law (such as the motion for new trial) au-
thorized courts to set aside jury verdicts under specific circums-
tances. The sole problem, according to Slocum, was that Penn-
sylvania’s procedural rule permitted the judge to “pass on the 
issues of fact” by issuing a judgment for the other party.143  
The assumption of exclusivity—the notion that the jury’s 
and judge’s constitutional duties vis-à-vis facts were wholly dis-
tinct and nonoverlapping—pervaded the Slocum decision. The 
following statement of the Court is illustrative: 
  In the trial by jury, the right to which is secured by the Seventh 
Amendment, both the court and the jury are essential factors. To the 
former is committed a power of direction and superintendence, and to 
the latter the ultimate determination of the issues of fact. Only 
through the coöperation of the two, each acting within its appropriate 
sphere, can the constitutional right be satisfied. And so, to . . . permit 
one to disregard the province of the other is to impinge on that 
right.144 
Indeed, the Slocum Court quoted considerable precedent 
that supported its exclusivist conception regarding the division 
of labor between judge and jury. In 1812, Justice Story, sitting 
as a circuit justice, had observed that “the facts once tried by a 
jury are never reexamined, unless a new trial is granted in the 
discretion of the court, before which the suit is depending . . . or 
unless the judgment of such court is reversed by a superior tri-
bunal.”145 The logic of exclusivity was even more clearly stated 
in an 1885 case in which the Supreme Court reversed a federal 
court that had awarded judgment for the defendant after the 
jury had returned a verdict for the plaintiff because “without a 
waiver of the right of trial by jury, by consent of parties, the 
court errs if it substitutes itself for the jury, and, passing upon 
the effect of the evidence, finds the facts involved in the issue, 
 
 141. See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 387–88. 
 142. See id. at 339 (“This we hold could not be done consistently with the 
Seventh Amendment, which not only preserves the common law right of trial 
by jury, but expressly forbids that issues of fact settled by such a trial shall be 
reëxamined otherwise than ‘according to the rules of the common law.’”).  
 143. Id. at 387–88. 
 144. Id. at 382 (emphasis added). 
 145. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 
16,750). Justice Story reiterated this understanding while writing for the Su-
preme Court in Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447–48 (1830). 
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and renders judgment thereon.”146 An 1899 Supreme Court de-
cision likewise stated:  
The facts there tried and decided cannot be re-ëxamined in any court 
of the United Stated States . . . ; no other mode of re-ëxamination is 
allowed than upon a new trial, either granted by the court in which 
the first trial was had or to which the record was returnable, or or-
dered by an appellate court for error in law . . . .147 
But exclusivity did not hold for long. Two lines of Supreme 
Court decisions together had the effect of giving judges signifi-
cant fact-finding powers. The first line of decisions addressed 
the question of when federal courts could keep cases from juries 
on the ground that insufficient evidence had been put forward. 
The second line of cases concerned what federal courts could do 
upon determining the evidence was not legally sufficient. Be-
cause this augmentation of the judge’s power occurred without 
depriving juries of their fact-finding powers, the result was a 
regime in which judges and juries both had fact-finding powers. 
As to the first line of cases, the traditional rule was that a 
“case must go to the jury unless there was ‘no evidence.’”148 The 
Court, in Improvement Co. v. Munson,149 acknowledged (though 
derogatorily renamed) the traditional rule, and then proceeded 
to “completely repudiate[]”150 it: 
Formerly it was held that if there was what is called a scintilla of evi-
dence in support of a case the judge was bound to leave it to the jury, 
but recent decisions of high authority have established a more rea-
sonable rule, that in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, 
there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is lit-
erally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can 
properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon 
whom the onus of proof is imposed.151 
In shifting from one legal test to another,152 the Court opened 
the door to judges assuming significant fact-finding powers. 
 
 146. Baylis v. Travellers’ Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316, 320–21 (1885) (emphasis 
added), quoted in Slocum, 228 U.S. at 386–87. 
 147. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899), quoted in Slocum, 
228 U.S. at 379. 
 148. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 404 (1943) (Black, J., 
dissenting). There are many examples of the traditional rule. See, e.g., Hick-
man v. Jones, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 197, 201 (1869) (ruling that where there is no 
evidence against the defendant the judge is in error if he does not order the 
jury to acquit); Drakely v. Gregg, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 242, 268 (1868) (holding 
that the case should go the jury “if the evidence tended to prove the position” 
of the party). 
 149. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442 (1871). 
 150. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 404 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 151. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 448 (second emphasis added). 
 152. The “recent decisions of high authority” on which the Supreme Court 
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Under the traditional rule, judges could not fact-find because 
the jury heard the case if there was “‘any evidence’ to support a 
party’s contention;”153 the judge could keep a matter from the 
jury only if there was no evidence to be weighed or analyzed 
and hence no facts to be found.154 Munson’s replacement test, 
by contrast, authorized judges to keep matters from the jury if 
the facts could not “properly” ground a verdict.155  
After the Munson rule took root,156 there was little ques-
tion that federal judges exercised fact-finding powers. This is 
well illustrated by the case of Pennsylvania Railroad v. Cham-
berlain,157 which concerned the propriety of a trial court’s order 
that a jury grant a verdict for the defendant. Writing for the 
Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand had reversed the district 
court’s judgment, ruling that the case should have proceeded to 
the jury because there was sufficient evidence to support a ver-
dict for the plaintiff.158 Citing to the Munson rule, the Supreme 
Court reversed Judge Hand, deciding that the testimony of 
plaintiff ’s witness could not have supported a verdict for the 
plaintiff. A fair reading of the case reveals that the Supreme 
Court made credibility determinations and weighed conflicting 
evidence.159 The Court tried to rebuff the accusation that it was 
finding facts by claiming there was no evidence of a collision in-
sofar as plaintiff ’s witness had said he heard a “‘loud crash’” 
but did not use the word “collision.”160 This is an utterly unper-
suasive reading of the evidentiary record. Plaintiff ’s witness, 
an experienced train yard worker, testified that he saw a fast-
er-moving nine-car train closely trailing a slower-moving two-
 
relied all were decisions from England that postdated 1791. See id. They ac-
cordingly had absolutely no binding authority on the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of the Seventh Amendment. 
 153. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 404 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 154. Cf. Greenleaf v. Birth, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 292, 299 (1835) (“Where there 
is no evidence tending to prove a particular fact, the court[s] are bound so to 
instruct the jury, when requested; but they cannot legally give any instruction 
which shall take from the jury the right of weighing the evidence and deter-
mining what effect it shall have.”). 
 155. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 448. 
 156. For some time after Munson, the Supreme Court continued to recite 
the pre-Munson “any evidence” test. See, e.g., Hepner v. United States, 213 
U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (summarizing the law as “requiring the court to send a 
case to the jury . . . where the evidence is conflicting on any essential point”). 
 157. 288 U.S. 333 (1933). 
 158. See Chamberlain v. Pa. R.R., 59 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir. 1932), rev’d, 
288 U.S. 333. 
 159. See Pa. R.R., 288 U.S. at 344. 
 160. Id. at 338. 
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car train, heard a loud crash, and thereafter discovered the de-
cedent’s body.161 This testimony plainly was sufficient to consti-
tute evidence of a collision, and the Court’s holding amounted 
to a decision to instead credit the testimony of the defendant’s 
witness that there had not been a train crash. Consider as well 
the Court’s blatant credibility assessment when it asserted that 
“[t]he fact that [the defendant railroad’s] witnesses were em-
ployees of the [railroad] . . . does not impair” their testimony.162  
The second line of cases responsible for the shift from ex-
clusivity to concurrence of fact-finding authority addressed 
what judges were permitted to do upon determining the evi-
dence to be insufficient to support a judgment. Two common 
law features had assured that juries, not judges, made ultimate 
findings of fact. First, the common law in 1791 did not have a 
procedure akin to the directed verdict under which a party 
could ask the court to rule in his favor after trial but before the 
jury’s verdict.163 Second, although the common law permitted 
the losing party to challenge verdicts on grounds of insufficient 
evidence, a winning motion netted a new trial before another 
jury, not a judge-awarded verdict.  
Twentieth century cases eliminated these two limitations, 
allowing the judge to wholly circumvent the jury. The Court in 
Galloway v. United States164 upheld the directed verdict under 
the newly adopted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permitting 
the judge to enter judgment after trial but before verdict on the 
ground of insufficient evidence.165 And Baltimore & Carolina 
Line v. Redman166 held that federal judges could not only disre-
gard a jury’s verdict on grounds of insufficient evidence, but al-
so immediately enter a verdict for the other party—the equiva-
 
 161. See id. at 336–37. 
 162. Id. at 343. For another example of the Court’s fact-finding, see the dis-
cussion of Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943), infra note 168. 
 163. The common law procedure permitting a party to move for judgment 
after trial but before verdict, the demurrer to the evidence, required that the 
moving party stipulate to the facts alleged by the nonmoving party. Galloway, 
319 U.S. at 390. The judge accordingly did not find facts, but took the facts 
stipulated by the moving party and applied the stipulated facts to the law. See 
Thomas, supra note 138, at 150–54. 
 164. 319 U.S. 372. 
 165. See id. at 389–90; see also Sward, supra note 140, at 599–613 (showing 
that earlier decisions had upheld directed verdicts where one of the parties 
had offered no evidence at all or where the court was asked to apply undis-
puted facts to the law).  
 166. 295 U.S. 654 (1935). 
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lent of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.167 A careful 
read of both the Galloway and Redman decisions reveals that 
these cases (unwittingly) showcased federal judges’ new fact-
finding powers.168 
Finally, fully understanding today’s regime of concurrent 
fact-finding authority requires consideration of the all-
 
 167. Redman predated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, pursuant 
to a federal statute then in force, applied the procedures of the state in which 
the federal court sat. See id. at 661. Redman was an abrupt break with the 
Slocum decision discussed above, which only twenty years before had held 
precisely the opposite. To be sure, the Redman Court distinguished Slocum on 
the ground that the trial court had not yet decided the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss and motion for directed verdict, both of which had been submitted to 
the court before the jury began its deliberations. See id. at 658–59. The Second 
Circuit had not deemed this technical difference to be material, and even the 
Redman Court acknowledged that “some parts of the [Slocum] opinion . . . give 
color to the interpretation put on it by the Court of Appeals.” Id. at 661. A fair 
reading of Slocum shows Redman’s acknowledgment to be a decided under-
statement. Commentators justifiably have understood Redman as having ef-
fectively reversed Slocum. See, e.g., Sward, supra note 140, at 613–24 (“con-
trast[ing]” Redman and Slocum and showing that Redman was not supported 
by other cases the opinion had relied upon); Thomas, supra note 138, at 168–
73 (concluding that Redman was a “drastic change” from Slocum). 
 168. With respect to Galloway, three dissenting Justices carefully reviewed 
the documentary and testimonial evidence that had been adduced at trial and 
convincingly demonstrated that the majority in the case, as well as the trial 
judge, had “weigh[ed] conflicting evidence” and made credibility assessments. 
See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 397 (Black, J., dissenting). In doing so, the Court 
upheld a directed verdict against a veteran who had sued for benefits due un-
der a war risk insurance policy. The veteran had the burden of proving “total 
and permanent” disability no later than May 31, 1919. Id. at 383–84 (majority 
opinion). The veteran’s guardian introduced testimony from a doctor who had 
diagnosed the veteran as suffering from a form of dementia that had been 
triggered by the shock of conflict on the battle field before 1919. Id. at 408 
(Black, J., dissenting). The veteran also had offered the testimony of two fel-
low soldiers, a friend who had known him both before and after the war, and 
his commanding officer, all of whom testified to behaviors that were consistent 
with the symptoms of insanity that the testifying doctor had identified. Id. at 
408–12. Reviewing this testimony in detail, three Justices reasonably con-
cluded in dissent that the majority of the Court “re-examine[d] testimony of-
fered in a common law suit [and] weigh[ed] conflicting evidence.” Id. at 397; 
see also Sward, supra note 140, at 603 (“The issue in Galloway could not be 
classified as anything other than a question of fact: was Galloway permanent-
ly and totally disabled by reason of mental illness as of May 31, 1919, or 
not?”). Simply put, the majority’s assertion that they gave “full credence to all 
of the testimony” is not credible. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 396. 
By the time Redman came before the Supreme Court, “four judges had 
considered the sufficiency of the evidence, with two believing that the evidence 
was sufficient, and two believing that it was not.” Sward, supra note 140, at 
616. This alone strongly suggests that the judges’ determination that the evi-
dence was insufficient was itself based on judicial fact-finding, a conclusion 
confirmed by a fair review of the record. Id. 
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important summary judgment procedure. Federal courts decid-
ing motions for summary judgment must determine if there is a 
“genuine issue as to any material fact”169 by asking whether “a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving par-
ty.”170 Under these standards, federal judges now “decide[] 
whether factual inferences from the evidence are reasonable,” 
with the result that “[c]ases that would have been decided by a 
jury under the common law are now dismissed by a judge under 
summary judgment.”171 To date, however, the Court has not 
been willing to acknowledge the degree to which federal courts 
now possess the fact-finding powers that used to belong solely 
to juries. 
To be clear, the cases explored above did not displace the 
jury’s fact-finding powers and replace one exclusivist regime 
with another. Rather, these decisions created a regime in which 
judges also had fact-finding powers. The contemporary result is 
a regime of concurrence in which judges and juries both have 
fact-finding powers: juries still find facts and return verdicts, 
but judges also exercise fact-finding powers when they issue di-
rected verdicts, judgments as a matter of law, and summary 
judgments.  
2. Juries and Non-Article III Adjudicatory Tribunals 
Juries today share adjudicatory fact-finding power not only 
with Article III judges, but with yet another governmental in-
stitution: judges on non-Article III tribunals. Administrative 
agencies are the most important of these non-Article III tribun-
als. The rule today, as stated in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission, is that “when 
Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign 
their adjudication to an administrative agency” whose non-
Article III administrative judge has the power to find facts.172 
Further, “[t]his is the case even if the Seventh Amendment 
would have required a jury [were] the adjudication of those 
rights [to be] assigned instead to a federal court.”173 In other 
 
 169. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). 
 170. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
 171. Thomas, supra note 138, at 143. 
 172. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 
430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977). 
 173. Id. Independent of the Seventh Amendment question of whether ad-
ministrative judges rather than juries can find facts is the question of whether 
adjudicatory facts can be found by non-Article III courts. This second inquiry 
is variously conceptualized as either a due process or an Article III question. 
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words, as regards public rights, the Supreme Court has forth-
rightly acknowledged that administrative agencies and juries 
have concurrent authority to fact-find. This amounts to a sig-
nificant degree of concurrent fact-finding authority because, as 
Professor Monaghan recently reminded us, “[t]he ‘public rights’ 
exception is a wide and significant one” that “has been signifi-
cantly enlarged so as to absorb much of what hitherto had fal-
len into the private rights domain.”174 
As with the trajectory from exclusivity to concurrence de-
tailed above in other doctrinal contexts, the Supreme Court has 
not always acknowledged this concurrent regime. To the con-
trary, during most of our country’s history, the Court has un-
derstood the Constitution’s allocation of adjudicatory fact-
finding authority in exclusivist terms. Cases from the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries regularly asserted that 
federal lawsuits brought by the federal government for civil pe-
nalties in violation of federal statutes—in other words, lawsuits 
premised on what today would be called “public rights”—
qualified as suits at common law that accordingly entitled the 
defendant to a fact-finding jury under the Seventh Amend-
ment.175 
The first case upholding a statute that transferred adjudi-
cation from trial courts to a jury-free administrative agency did 
so on the grounds that there existed an “exigency” on account of 
the First World War, which justified the “suspension of [the] 
ordinary remedies” of trial by jury.176 The “publicly noto-
rious . . . emergency” consisted of inadequate rental properties 
in the District of Columbia, which meant that there were not 
adequate accommodations for federal employees.177 An Act of 
Congress addressed the problem by permitting tenants to re-
 
Most federal legislative schemes provide that agency facts are reviewable by 
federal courts—sometimes district courts, sometimes only courts of appeals—
under a substantial-evidence test. Id. at 455 & n.13. This has repeatedly been 
held constitutional. Id. at 456. The Supreme Court has not yet decided wheth-
er Congress could “commit the adjudication of public rights and the imposition 
of fines for their violation to an administrative agency without any sort of in-
tervention by a court at any stage of the proceedings.” Id. at 455 n.13. 
 174. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 868, 873. 
 175. See, e.g., Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (stating 
that the defendant was “entitled to have a jury summoned” in an action of 
debt brought by the United States to recover a penalty under federal statute 
regulating the immigration of aliens); see also United States v. Regan, 232 
U.S. 37, 47 (1914) (same). 
 176. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156, 158 (1921). 
 177. Id. at 154. 
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main in possession at the same rent they had been paying so 
long as the rent paid was “reasonable” in the determination of a 
housing commission established by the act.178  
The bulk of Justice Holmes’s opinion in the Block v. Hirsh 
decision did not address the Seventh Amendment, but instead 
considered whether the rent control statute violated the Due 
Process, Takings, and Contracts Clauses.179 Only after conclud-
ing that “a public exigency will justify the legislature in re-
stricting property rights in land to a certain extent without 
compensation” did the Court, in its final paragraph, address 
the Seventh Amendment.180 It cursorily concluded: 
If the power of the Commission established by the statute to regulate 
the relation is established, as we think it is, by what we have said, 
this objection [based on the Seventh Amendment] amounts to little. 
To regulate the relation and to decide the facts affecting it are hardly 
separable.181 
In other words, so long as constitutional limitations apart from 
the Seventh Amendment did not render the statute’s substan-
tive provisions unconstitutional, the Seventh Amendment was 
not violated either. To this not very self-evident proposition182 
Holmes added two more brief justifications. The very emergen-
cy justifying the act’s substantive provisions equally excuses 
the summary procedures because “[a] part of the exigency is to 
secure a speedy and summary administration of the law.”183 In 
any event, concluded Holmes, not much jury fact-finding was 
displaced because “[w]hile the act is in force there is little to de-
cide except whether the rent allowed is reasonable.”184 
 
 178. Id. at 154–57. 
 179. See id. at 153–57. 
 180. Id. at 156, 158. 
 181. Id. at 158. 
 182. Holmes’s proposition here is not self-evident because the Seventh 
Amendment is a constitutional limitation that is independent of the Due 
Process Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Contracts Clause. Accordingly, 
the mere fact that a statute does not violate these other clauses does not mean 
that it could not violate the Seventh Amendment for it is elementary that a set 
of facts might violate one doctrine but not another. For a similar argument, 
see Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amend-
ment, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1041–42, 1099–1105 (1999) (describing the Se-
venth Amendment as an “independent constitutional right”). 
 183. Block, 256 U.S. at 158. 
 184. Id. In fact, however, questions about whether the rent was “reasona-
ble” also could arise under the Act. Because the Act provided that the owner 
shall have possession following thirty days notice “‘for actual and bona fide oc-
cupancy by himself, or his wife, children or dependents,’” the question could 
arise as to whether an owner seeking to displace a tenant on this ground in-
deed was going to occupy the residence. Id. at 154. Indeed, the owner in the 
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In short, the Block decision upheld what it deemed to be 
only a limited incursion by an administrative agency into the 
jury’s fact-finding domain, and did so on the narrow ground of 
necessity to remedy a national emergency. A corollary was that 
a citizen’s “ordinary remedies” included the right to have a jury 
decide the issues that were being decided by the administrative 
agency.185  
The next two Supreme Court decisions upholding adminis-
trative agencies’ fact-finding powers did so with rationales fully 
consistent with exclusivity. The 1937 case of NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp.,186 best known for its Commerce Clause 
holding, also decided that the National Labor Relations Board’s 
power to decide whether an unfair labor practice had been 
committed and to order backpay did not violate the Seventh 
Amendment. The Court reasoned that the NLRB’s power did 
not trench at all on the jury’s role guarded by the Seventh 
Amendment because “[t]he instant case is not a suit at common 
law or in the nature of such a suit. The proceeding is one un-
known to the common law. It is a statutory proceeding.”187 Be-
cause the Seventh Amendment by its terms applies only to 
“Suits at common law,” and because the NLRB adjudicated a 
statutory proceeding rather than a suit at common law, the 
Court reasoned that the NLRB was performing functions to 
which the Seventh Amendment did not apply.188  
The Court was still relying on the same exclusivity-friendly 
rationale in the 1960s. Katchen v. Landy189 upheld the power of 
a bankruptcy court, sitting without a jury, to adjudicate issues 
that would have been entitled to a jury trial if the trustee had 
pressed the issues in a separate lawsuit in federal court.190 The 
 
Block case had alleged that he wanted the premises for his own use and the 
tenant had denied this. Id. at 156. 
 185. Id. at 158. 
 186. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 187. Id. at 48–49. 
 188. Id. The NLRB Court provided a second rationale that also was consis-
tent with exclusivity. The Seventh Amendment’s application to cases at com-
mon law long had been understood to mean that Seventh Amendment rights 
did not attach to cases in equity, and the NLRB Court ruled that the case 
brought by the NLRB was analogous to a case in equity rather than law. Id. 
The Court further held that any monetary relief via orders of backpay were 
merely “incident[al] to [nonlegal relief ] even though damages might have been 
recovered in an action at law.” Id. at 48. 
 189. 382 U.S. 323 (1966). 
 190. Id. at 336 (holding that bankruptcy judges can decide voidable prefe-
rences without a jury). 
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Court reasoned that what would have been a legal claim if pur-
sued on its own in an Article III federal court is “convert[ed]” 
into an equitable claim when it arises “as part of the process of 
allowance and disallowance of claims” in bankruptcy.191 Be-
cause the Seventh Amendment does not attach to equitable 
proceedings—its reference to “Suits at common law” long has 
been understood to mean that the Seventh Amendment applies 
to suits in law but not in equity192—the Seventh Amendment 
did not allocate power to the jury to hear voidable preference 
claims raised in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.193 This 
reasoning is consistent with exclusivity because, as in Jones & 
Laughlin Steel, the Court’s rationale meant that the Seventh 
Amendment did not apply at all to the bankruptcy judge’s ac-
tivities. 
Two cases in 1974 radically shifted the rationale for agen-
cies’ powers to engage in adjudicatory fact-finding and, in the 
process, created an explicit regime of concurrence. The question 
in Curtis v. Loether was whether the Seventh Amendment en-
titled litigants to a jury trial in actions for damages under the 
Civil Rights Act’s fair housing provisions.194 According to the 
logic of Jones & Laughlin Steel the answer should have been 
“no” because the housing right at issue in Curtis was “unknown 
to the common law” and instead was “a statutory proceed-
ing.”195 In finding that litigants were entitled to a jury, Curtis 
wholly reconceptualized Jones & Laughlin Steel, asserting that 
the case “merely stands for the proposition that the Seventh 
Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative pro-
ceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the 
whole concept of administrative adjudication and would sub-
stantially interfere with the NLRB’s role in the statutory 
scheme.”196  
Three aspects of Curtis merit notice. First, whereas Jones 
& Laughlin justified its conclusion on the nature of the legal 
right at issue (that the legal right was statutory rather than 
common law-based), Curtis’s holding instead turned on where 
the litigation occurred (a jury-free administrative proceeding 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446–47 (1830). 
 193. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336–38. 
 194. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 190 (1974). 
 195. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1936). 
 196. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194. 
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rather than a federal court).197 Second, this shift created a re-
gime of concurrence: under Curtis’s approach, the identical le-
gal right could be decided by either a jury-free administrative 
agency or a court with a jury. Third, Curtis justified adminis-
trative agencies’ adjudicatory powers on the basis of naked 
pragmatism: the Seventh Amendment is “generally inapplica-
ble to administrative proceedings” because “jury trials would be 
incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudica-
tion.”198 
The same three elements are on display in the 1974 case of 
Pernell v. Southall Realty.199 Like the Curtis decision, Pernell 
rerationalized an earlier decision—this time Block v. Hirsh—
that had cabined the extent to which agencies could invade the 
jury’s turf.200 Whereas Block had upheld the agency’s jury-free 
adjudicatory powers on the ground that exigent circumstances 
justified an exception to a litigant’s “ordinary remedies,”201 
Pernell recharacterized Block as standing for a business-as-
usual principle, stating that the case “merely stands for the 
principle that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplica-
ble in administrative proceedings.”202 As in Curtis, the Seventh 
Amendment’s inapplicability was justified purely on practical 
grounds.203 Finally, Pernell explicitly acknowledged the regime 
of concurrence it had created. Pernell ruled that the Seventh 
Amendment required a jury to adjudicate the right to posses-
sion of real property at issue in the case because the adjudica-
tion took place in an ordinary federal court.204 The Court went 
on to observe that “[w]e may assume that the Seventh Amend-
ment would not be a bar to a congressional effort to entrust 
landlord-tenant disputes, including those over the right to pos-
session, to an administrative agency.”205  
The Pernell decision thus expressly acknowledges that the 
identical dispute could be resolved either by a jury before a 
court or a jury-free administrative agency. Concurrence was 
 
 197. See id. at 195. 
 198. Id. at 194 (emphasis added). 
 199. 416 U.S. 363 (1974). 
 200. See id. at 382–83. 
 201. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921). 
 202. Pernell, 416 U.S. at 383. 
 203. See id. (“[J]ury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of 
administrative adjudication.”). 
 204. See id. at 383. 
 205. Id.; see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977) (affirming this rule). 
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fully acknowledged. As this subpart’s tour through the case law 
shows, though, such a forthright acknowledgment was a long 
time coming. 
C. ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION OF ARTICLE III AND NON-
ARTICLE III COURTS 
Article III’s language that the “judicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such infe-
rior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish”206 could readily be interpreted to mean that federal 
judicial power only can be vested in Article III courts207—in 
other words, in an exclusivist manner. 
And exclusivity indeed is the first approach that was tak-
en. Consider in this regard the circuit court opinion in United 
States v. More.208 An 1801 federal statute allowed justices of 
the peace for the District of Columbia to collect fees from liti-
gants for the judicial services they performed.209 Though this 
provision was repealed a year later, justice of the peace Benja-
min More continued to collect fees.210 When More was indicted, 
he contended that the 1802 repeal was a reduction in compen-
sation in violation of Article III, Section 1.211 The Circuit Court 
of the District of Columbia agreed. Dismissing the indictment, 
the court said: 
  It is difficult to conceive how a magistrate can lawfully sit in 
judgment, exercising judicial powers, and enforcing his judgments by 
process of law, without holding a court. I consider such a court, thus 
exercising a part of the judicial power of the United States, as an in-
ferior court, and the justice of the peace as the judge of that court.212 
 
 206. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 207. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 859 
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“On its face, Article III, § 1, seems to prohibit 
the vesting of any judicial functions in either the Legislative or the Executive 
Branch.”); Nelson, supra note 55, at 565 (arguing that Article III “strongly im-
plies that neither Congress nor entities within the executive branch can exer-
cise” judicial authority); cf. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 868 (“Article III 
might (at least as an original matter) have been understood to require that if 
any adjudication by federal tribunals occurs, it must occur in Article III 
courts.”). 
 208. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805). The More case was brought to my atten-
tion by an intriguing article by Professor Gary Lawson. See Gary Lawson, Ter-
ritorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV. 853, 878–
86 (1990) (discussing Article III and territorial judges). 
 209. See Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 11, 2 Stat. 103, 107. 
 210. See More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 159. 
 211. See id. at 165–66. 
 212. Id. at 161 n.*. 
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The circuit court’s holding was predicated on an unspoken 
assumption of exclusivity. Having decided that the justice of 
the peace served on a federally created court that acted judi-
cially, the circuit court automatically concluded that the Dis-
trict of Columbia’s court was an Article III tribunal that accor-
dingly enjoyed protection against diminishment of 
compensation.213 Without the assumption of exclusivity, the 
fact that the justice of the peace served on a federal court exer-
cising judicial power would not automatically have meant that 
it was an Article III federal court.214 
But exclusivity did not hold for long. As Professor Monag-
han has written, “[t]he expanding national government and the 
rapidly expanding national domain quickly rendered any such 
conception untenable. From the very beginning, the Court rec-
ognized ‘exceptions,’ i.e., that significant federal adjudication 
could occur in non-Article III tribunals.”215 
Same-effect concurrence was first adopted in the 1828 de-
cision of American Insurance Co. v. Canter.216 The case con-
cerned a ship carrying a large quantity of cotton that had been 
lost off the coast of the territory of Florida.217 A portion of the 
cotton had been saved by rescue ships, and the issue was 
whether a federally created territorial court was competent to 
adjudicate salvage cases.218 Canter acknowledged that salvage 
 
 213. Id.; see also O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933) 
(holding that judges of the District of Columbia’s Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeals are constitutionally protected from having their compensation re-
duced). 
 214. Incontrovertible evidence of this proposition is that the United States 
Supreme Court reasoned in just this fashion 170 years after More was decided, 
ruling that Congress had the power to create a non-Article III court known as 
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, which could try criminal cases 
for violations of federal law but that the court’s judges enjoyed neither life te-
nure nor salary protection since they did not sit on an Article III court. See 
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 390 (1973). Gary Lawson also has 
pointed out this relationship between the More and Palmore decisions. See 
Lawson, supra note 208, at 893. 
 215. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 868; see also Paul M. Bator, The Consti-
tution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 
65 IND. L.J. 233, 241–42 (1990) (“[A]rticle I courts and the article III courts 
frequently exercise a concurrent jurisdiction or otherwise share portions of the 
judicial business.”). 
 216. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
 217. See id. at 513. 
 218. The court that heard the salvage claim was created by the Florida ter-
ritorial legislature pursuant to a federal statute, which had empowered the 
legislature to do so. See Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 532. Though the petitioner 
argued that “Congress cannot vest admiralty jurisdiction in Courts created by 
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fell within the admiralty jurisdiction that itself is part of what 
Article III calls the “judicial Power of the United States.” Yet 
the judges on the territorial courts held “their offices for four 
years,” not the life tenure guaranteed by Article III.219 Canter 
held that although the territorial courts were not Article III 
“constitutional Courts,” they nonetheless had jurisdiction to 
hear salvage claims.220 
In upholding concurrent adjudicatory powers as between 
Article III federal courts and non-Article III territorial courts, 
Canter accepted same-effect concurrence. In doing so, Chief 
Justice Marshall vociferously rejected same-source concur-
rence, explaining that: 
[The territorial courts were] not constitutional Courts, in which the 
judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general govern-
ment can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it . . . . The ju-
risdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial 
power which is defined in the 3d Article of the Constitution, but is con-
ferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which 
that body possesses over the territories of the United States.221 
Two observations are in order. First, Canter is an early ex-
ample of the rejection of a strong form of expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius: that Article III vests federal judicial power in 
“constitutional Courts” did not preclude Congress from confer-
ring adjudicatory jurisdiction in other entities. Second, Canter’s 
reasoning depended on a strong distinction between same-effect 
and same-source concurrence. The Court proclaimed that Flor-
ida salvage courts could do what they did, despite their being 
run by judges without life tenure, only because their judicial 
powers did not qualify as part of the “judicial Power of the 
United States.”222  
 
the territorial legislature,” the Court quite reasonably collapsed the distinction 
between delegator and delegate and instead analyzed the issue as if Congress 
itself had directly created the salvage court in question. See id. at 546. Profes-
sor Lawson treats Canter’s discussion as mere dictum because the salvage 
court had been created by the territorial legislature rather than by Congress. 
See Lawson, supra note 208, at 888, 892. But he offers no reason for believing 
that the delegate (the territorial legislature) should have more power to create 
a non-Article III court than the delegator (Congress). In any event, as Lawson 
himself notes, subsequent Supreme Court decisions treated Canter’s discus-
sion as a holding, not dicta. See id. at 892. 
 219. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 512. 
 220. Id. at 546. 
 221. Id. (emphasis added). 
 222. To be clear, I mean simply to characterize Canter’s reasoning from the 
internal perspective of its authors, not to praise it. Many have trenchantly cri-
tiqued Cantor for failing to explain why the federal territorial court’s exercise 
of admiralty adjudication was not part of the “judicial Power of the United 
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The other great opinions of the nineteenth century uphold-
ing non-Article III federal tribunals likewise justified their 
holdings on the distinction between same-effect concurrence, 
which they tolerated, and same-source concurrence, which they 
did not. Consider the important case of Murray’s Lessee v. Ho-
boken Land & Improvement Co.223 Samuel Swartwout was a 
federal collector of customs for the port of New York.224 Pur-
suant to an 1820 statute, the Treasury Department conducted 
an internal audit and determined that Swartwout had collected 
almost $1.4 million more than he had remitted to the govern-
ment.225 Under authority of the statute, the solicitor of the 
treasury issued a “distress warrant” that directed a federal 
marshal to levy against and thereafter sell certain of Swart-
wout’s real property to satisfy his debt.226  
It was argued in Murray’s Lessee that the marshal’s sale of 
Swartwout’s property was unconstitutional because the Trea-
sury officials’ acts (auditing Swartwout’s account, ascertaining 
its balance, and issuing the distress warrant) constituted the 
exercise of United States judicial power that only could have 
been undertaken by an Article III court.227 In upholding the 
Treasury officials’ acts, Murray’s Lessee famously announced 
what has become known as the “public rights” doctrine.228 In 
the Court’s own words:  
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented 
in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and 
which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress 
may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the Unit-
ed States, as it may deem proper.229 
 
States.” See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 22, at 36–39 (“[S]upporting policy and 
constitutional arguments [for the status of territorial courts] are far from set-
tled.”); Bator, supra note 215, at 241–42 (contending that Justice Marshall 
“invent[ed]” the position of territorial courts as non-Article III, “legislative 
Courts”); Lawson, supra note 208, at 887–93 (“[T]he Court made no attempt to 
reconcile this dictum with its prior, and at least arguably inconsistent, case 
law . . . .”). Below I discuss Justice Harlan’s rerationalization of this part of 
Canter’s rationale. See infra notes 233–35 and accompanying text. 
 223. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). 
 224. Id. at 275. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 274. 
 227. Id. at 275. 
 228. See Monaghan, supra note 26, at 871 (noting that Murray’s Lessee 
“still remains the fountainhead for the modern public rights doctrine”); Nel-
son, supra note 55, at 586–90 (discussing Murray’s Lessee and the special ex-
ception for tax collection). 
 229. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284. 
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The “public rights” doctrine is an example of concurrence inso-
far as such rights may be adjudicated in Article III tribunals or 
Article I tribunals. Like Canter, Murray’s Lessee relied on a 
strong distinction between same-effect and same-source con-
currence. The Court upheld the challenged arrangement on the 
ground that the Article I official was not acting judicially and, 
conversely, “admitted” that “if the auditing of [Swartout’s] ac-
count, and the ascertainment of its balance, and the issuing of 
this process, was an exercise of the judicial power of the United 
States, the proceeding was void; for the officers who performed 
these acts could exercise no part of that judicial power.”230 The 
treasury officials’ acts were constitutional only because the sub-
ject-matter was not “necessarily . . . a judicial controversy”231 
despite the fact that it was something over “which the judicial 
power c[ould] be exerted.”232 
Though Canter and Murray’s Lessee both embraced same-
effect concurrence, the two decisions also suggested a discom-
fort with concurrence. Consider Chief Justice Marshall’s ada-
mant yet unjustified insistence that territorial courts’ adjudica-
tory powers were not part of Article III’s judicial power, and 
Murray’s Lessee’s resolve that the Article I official was not act-
ing judicially. By contrast, the Court’s comfort with concur-
rence grew immeasurably in the twentieth century. This can be 
seen in Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court in Glidden Co. v. 
Zdanok,233 where Harlan reworked Chief Justice Marshall’s 
reasoning in the Canter decision. Glidden acknowledged Chief 
Justice Marshall’s averment that territorial courts were not 
courts “in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitu-
tion . . . can be deposited” and were “incapable of receiving” the 
judicial power of which the Constitution spoke,234 but Justice 
Harlan went on to state that “[f]ar from being ‘incapable of re-
ceiving’ federal-question jurisdiction, the territorial courts have 
long exercised a jurisdiction commensurate in this regard with 
that of the regular federal courts.”235 
 
 230. Id. at 275. 
 231. Id. at 281. 
 232. Id. 
 233. 370 U.S. 530 (1962). 
 234. Id. at 544 (quoting Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 
(1828)). 
 235. Id. at 545 n.13 (emphasis added). Though Harlan labored to show that 
his and Marshall’s words in Canter were consistent—“[a]ll the Chief Justice 
meant . . . is that in the territories cases and controversies falling within the 
enumeration of Article III may be heard and decided in courts constituted 
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By the end of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
had become fully at ease with concurrence. This is most clearly 
seen in the decision of Commodities Futures Trading Commis-
sion v. Schor.236 Going the final step beyond Glidden’s talk of 
“commensurate” power, Schor observed that Congress could 
“authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-
Article III tribunal.”237 Though the counterclaim at issue in the 
case was a “‘private’ right for which state law provide[d] the 
rule of decision,” and which accordingly was “a claim of the 
kind assumed to be at the ‘core’ of matters normally reserved to 
Article III courts,”238 Schor rejected the view that “bright-line 
rules” confined such claims to Article III courts239 and upheld 
the non-Article III court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Surely Pro-
fessor Monaghan is correct when he speaks of today’s “system 
of shared adjudication between agencies and Article III 
courts”240 and, in so doing, Monaghan provides a full-throated 
recognition of concurrence. 
D. LEGISLATIVE POWER: CONGRESS AND AGENCIES  
Early Supreme Court decisions and early treatises under-
stood Article I, Section 1’s declaration that “[a]ll legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress” in exclu-
sivist terms: that only Congress may legislate.241 The threat to 
congressional exclusivity in the early days came in the form of 
apparent congressional delegations of legislative power to other 
governmental institutions.242 The response to such actions was 
 
without regard to the limitations of that article,” id. at 544–45—surely Har-
lan’s words reflect a greater comfort with concurrence.  
 236. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Justice Brennan also acknowledged 
nonexclusivity while advancing a very different approach to understanding 
non-Article III courts. Justice Brennan later explained that although “Article 
III, § 1, seems to prohibit the vesting of any judicial functions in either the 
Legislative or the Executive Branch . . . [t]he Court has, however, recognized 
three narrow exceptions to the otherwise absolute mandate of Article III.” 
Schor, 478 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 237. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. 
 238. Id. at 853. 
 239. Id. at 857. 
 240. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 873 (emphasis added). 
 241. Merrill, supra note 50, at 2098 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1) (em-
phasis added). 
 242. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 
327, 353–72 (2002) (describing early cases involving delegation of legislative 
power). 
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unequivocal.243 With respect to congressional delegations to the 
executive branch, the 1892 decision of Marshall Field & Co. v. 
Clark asserted “[t]hat congress cannot delegate legislative pow-
er to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital 
to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government 
ordained by the Constitution.”244 Addressing legislative delega-
tions to courts, Chief Justice Marshall stated in Wayman v. 
Southard that “[i]t will not be contended that Congress can del-
egate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are 
strictly and exclusively legislative.”245 Speaking more general-
ly, Thomas Cooley’s nineteenth-century treatise declares that 
“[o]ne of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the 
power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be 
delegated by that department to any other body or authori-
ty.”246  
Virtually everyone today acknowledges, however, that 
these nineteenth-century statements of congressional exclusivi-
ty do not describe contemporary American government.247 A 
significant amount of lawmaking today occurs in the extracon-
gressional governmental entities known as administrative 
agencies.248  
 
 243. See id. Perhaps this was only rhetorical: in none of the early cases did 
the Court strike down a federal statute on nondelegation grounds. See Merrill, 
supra note 50, at 2103 (explaining that early cases did not result in invalida-
tion of a statute). 
 244. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). 
 245. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825). Chief Justice 
Marshall’s formulation here concededly is ambiguous as to whether legislative 
power can be delegated: it might be thought that he meant to say that powers 
that are “strictly and exclusively legislative” cannot be delegated, but that 
matters that are legislative in character but not “exclusively legislative” may 
be delegated. When read in context, however, it is clear that the Chief Justice 
meant to contrast “strictly and exclusively legislative” with matters that are 
non-legislative yet still may be undertaken by the Congress, not with matters 
that are legislative and yet delegable. See id. at 43 (stating that “Congress 
may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully 
exercise itself ” and using the example of congressional delegation to courts of 
functions associated with the judicial process); see Lawson, supra note 242, at 
358–59 (reaching a similar conclusion). 
 246. THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 224 (8th ed. 1927). 
 247. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal 
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 40–46 (1985) (discussing delegation to courts); 
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 57, at 1762 (“Delegation of powers 
is .  .  .  common in public and private life . . . .”). 
 248. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 50, at 2099 (“Congress has massively de-
legated legislative rulemaking authority to administrative agencies.”); Posner 
& Vermeule, supra note 57, at 1745–53 (justifying delegation to agencies); 
Sunstein, supra note 77, at 315 (“[T]he United States Code has become littered 
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As a formal doctrinal matter, though, contemporary consti-
tutional doctrine has not been willing to part with the myth of 
exclusivity. The nondelegation doctrine still purports to abso-
lutely prohibit the delegation of legislative power.249 A recent 
nondelegation decision, Whitman v. American Trucking Associ-
ations, Inc.,250 is representative of contemporary doctrine251 
when it asserts that “[i]n a delegation challenge, the constitu-
tional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative 
power to the agency. Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution 
vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress 
of the United States.’ This text permits no delegation of those 
powers.”252  
How can this exclusivist rationale be harmonized with the 
contemporary reality of widespread rulemaking by agencies? 
There is a simple formal answer: the Court has equated legisla-
tive power with discretion and has concluded that no legislative 
power is delegated so long as Congress provides an “intelligible 
principle” that cabins the administrative agency’s discretion.253 
 
with provisions asking one or another administrative agency to do whatever it 
thinks best.”). 
 249. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 2119 (“[T]he sharing of the legislative 
power is not permitted . . . .”). 
 250. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 251. Earlier case law formulated the constraint on Congress’s ability to 
delegate differently. Chief Justice Marshall stated that there is some inexact 
“line . . . which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely re-
gulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general 
provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such 
general provisions to fill up the details.” Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825). Today’s “intelligible principle” formulation originated in 
the 1928 decision of J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 
409 (1935). Scholars debate to what degree Hampton’s formulation 
represented a change in the doctrine. Compare Lawson, supra note 242, at 
368–72 (arguing against the view that Hampton altered the doctrine an-
nounced by Chief Justice Marshall), with Posner & Vermeule, supra note 57, 
at 1740 (“The critical passage from Wayman v. Southard, then, adopts a dif-
ferent theory than the one modern nondelegation proponents have read into 
it.”). 
 252. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added). Other cases have rea-
soned similarly. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) 
(“Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another 
branch of Government.”); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 
287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) (“That the legislative power of Congress cannot be dele-
gated is, of course, clear.”); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 407 (explain-
ing that Congress may not delegate lawmaking power). 
 253. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (stating that Congress may dele-
gate “decisionmaking authority [to] agencies” as long as the legislative act in-
cludes some guiding “intelligible principle” (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co., 
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But the Court has applied this standard extraordinarily loose-
ly.254 It has been deemed to be met by statutes that instruct 
agencies to regulate on the basis of “public interest, conveni-
ence, or necessity,”255 to set “fair and equitable prices,”256 or to 
set ambient air quality standards that are “requisite to protect 
public health.”257 In fact, the Court struck down statutes on 
nondelegation grounds on only two occasions—and both oc-
curred in 1935 before (the first) Justice Roberts’s famous 
“switch in time.”258 Cass Sunstein puts it nicely when he says 
that “it is more accurate, speaking purely descriptively, to see 
1935 as the real anomaly. We might say that the conventional 
[nondelegation] doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad 
ones (and counting).”259 
As a formal matter, defining legislative power as it has 
permits the Court to continue to assert that no legislative pow-
er has been delegated. As a pragmatic matter, however, by con-
struing the nondelegation doctrine’s “intelligible principle” so 
broadly, the Court has sanctioned a regime of concurrence un-
der which more than one governmental entity—Congress and 
agencies—exercise de facto legislative power. This is what has 
led Justices Stevens and Souter to criticize the Court for “pre-
tend[ing] . . . that the authority delegated” to administrative 
agencies “is somehow not ‘legislative power’,” advocating in-
stead that “it would be both wiser and more faithful to what we 
have actually done in delegation cases to admit that agency 
 
276 U.S. at 409)); Merrill, supra note 50, at 2119 (explaining that the Supreme 
Court’s current version of the nondelegation doctrine uses “the discretionary 
meaning of ‘legislative power’”). 
 254. For example, Thomas Merrill recently has argued that “legislative 
power” entails “the power to make rules for the governance of society,” Merrill, 
supra note 50, at 2115, that administrative agencies exercise precisely this 
power today, and that they properly do so as long as Congress explicitly dele-
gates them this power. Id. at 2120. Gary Lawson describes the status quo as 
one where the Court has found the intelligible principle standard to be satis-
fied by “any collection of words that Congress chose to string together.” Law-
son, supra note 242, at 371. Other scholars who have noted that the nondele-
gation doctrine fails to curb delegations of de facto lawmaking authority to 
agencies include David Schoenbrod and Martin Redish. See generally REDISH, 
supra note 22; DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW 
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).  
 255. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943). 
 256. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427 (1944). 
 257. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473. 
 258. Sunstein, supra note 77, at 318. 
 259. Id. at 322. 
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rulemaking authority is ‘legislative power.’”260 To use this Ar-
ticle’s terminology, Justices Stevens and Souter have argued 
that the federal legislative power today is concurrently exer-
cised by Congress and administrative agencies.  
Virtually the entire scholarly community concurs that Jus-
tices Stevens and Souter have the better of the argument as a 
purely descriptive matter: it is widely agreed that the Court’s 
expansive interpretation of “intelligible principle” means that 
agencies exercise de facto legislative power.261 This raises an 
interesting question: why does a majority of the Court continue 
to cling to the exclusivist rationale that no legislative power 
has been, nor can be, delegated? Precedent provides a large 
part of the answer: as Justices Stevens and Souter acknowl-
edge, the Court’s past opinions have uniformly asserted that 
agencies do not make law but instead make something else262—
akin to the nineteenth-century cases explored in the previous 
subpart that insisted that Article I courts do not exercise feder-
al judicial power.263  
But that only pushes back the question, for then it must be 
asked why earlier Courts adopted the exclusivist assumption 
that only Congress could exercise legislative power. Answering 
this question is complicated by the fact that early Congresses 
enacted statutes that are naturally understood as having dele-
gated lawmaking power to the executive and judicial 
branches:264 one “statute provid[ed] for military pensions ‘under 
such regulations as the President of the United States may di-
rect,’”265 another authorized members of the executive branch 
“to license ‘any proper person[]’ to trade with Indian tribes ‘[by] 
such rules and regulations as the President [shall] pre-
 
 260. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 261. See supra note 254. The consensus breaks down with respect to what, 
if anything, should be done about this. Compare Merrill, supra note 50, at 
2158, 2165 (arguing that delegation is preferable to nondelegation and advo-
cating for rejection of the nondelegation doctrine), with SCHOENBROD, supra 
note 254, at 155–80 (arguing that the court should bar delegation).  
 262. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) (acknowledging that “there is 
language in our opinions that supports the Court’s articulation of our holding” 
and citing to a raft of such cases). 
 263. See supra Part II.C. 
 264. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 57, at 1735–36 (setting forth a list 
of such statutes). 
 265. Id. at 1735 (quoting Act of September 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95, 95). 
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scribe,’”266 and yet another “authorized the courts to ‘make and 
establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting of busi-
ness in the [federal] courts.’”267 Congress delegated portions of 
its nonlegislative powers as well. For instance, although the 
Constitution grants Congress the power to call forth the state 
militias,268 the Militia Act of 1792 granted the President the 
power to activate militias “whenever the United States shall be 
invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign 
nation or Indian tribe.”269  
In short, the early Supreme Court decisions’ assertions 
that Congress’s powers could not be delegated flew in the face 
of contrary contemporary practice.270 What then explains the 
Court’s insistence on exclusivity? The same question can be ap-
plied to the Court’s contemporary doctrine, which to this day 
formally denies that legislative power can be delegated and as-
serts that only Congress can legislate. The best answer I can 
muster is that the Court’s continual exclusivist rhetoric strong-
ly evidences the ongoing power of exclusivist sensibilities.  
Finally, to fully appreciate the degree to which institutions 
apart from Congress exercise de facto legislative power we 
must not confine our inquiry to administrative agencies. There 
is yet another governmental institution outside of Congress 
where significant lawmaking occurs: courts, particularly when 
they interpret vague statutes that do not fall under the rule-
making aegis of an administrative agency.271 Federal antitrust 
law is an excellent example, for almost the entirety of antitrust 
law is the creation of courts.272 Copyright’s fair use doctrine is 
another example.273 
 
 266. Id. (quoting Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, 137). 
 267. Id. (quoting Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 83). 
 268. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 269. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264, 264. 
 270. As shown above, this is also true of the Court’s early approaches to 
non-Article III courts, supra Part II.C, and its early insistence that only juries 
find facts, supra Part II.B. 
 271. This is typically, but not wholly, overlooked. Professors Martin Redish 
and Gary Lawson are two exceptional scholars who have discussed these sorts 
of delegations. See REDISH, supra note 22; Lawson, supra note 242. 
 272. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 
688 (1978) (explaining that the legislative history of the Sherman Act “makes 
it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the sta-
tute’s broad mandate”). 
 273. The 1976 copyright statute codified the common law fair use doctrine, 
see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006), but used open-ended language that was not in-
tended to “freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid 
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In other words, when Congress enacts vague statutory lan-
guage without delegating rulemaking authority to an executive 
agency, courts in effect must generate the law as they decide 
questions unresolved by Congress on a case-by-case basis—a 
process that is variously called statutory interpretation or fed-
eral common law.274 Constitutional doctrine imposes virtually 
no limits on this sort of congressional delegation. To begin, the 
nondelegation doctrine does not apply at all. Though the void-
for-vagueness doctrine at one point was conceptualized, inter 
alia, as an antidelegation separation of powers principle, today 
courts almost exclusively treat void-for-vagueness as a due 
process principle designed to provide notice and to ensure non-
arbitrary enforcement.275 Further, as a practical matter, the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine primarily has been applied to state 
laws,276 and is limited almost exclusively to the criminal and 
First Amendment contexts.277  
 
technological change.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680. For a full discussion, see Edward Lee, Technological 
Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
 274. See Rosen, supra note 115, at 804–05 (describing statutory interpreta-
tion and the creation of federal common law in the context of preemption). 
 275. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (“A statute can be im-
permissibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First, if it fails to 
provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand 
what conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.”). Some earlier void-for-vagueness cases con-
ceptualized the doctrine as ameliorating legislative delegations of authority to 
courts and juries. See, e.g., United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 523–24 
(1942) (holding that the statute was “not vague nor does it delegate policy-
making powers to either court or jury”); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 
457 (1927) (voiding a statute because it impermissibly “submit[ted] to the 
jury” an issue that is “legislative, not judicial”). However, this antidelegation 
rationale has “largely been abandoned in favor of . . . preventing arbitrary and 
discriminatory law enforcement.” Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 
282 (2003). One modern Supreme Court decision has revived the nondelega-
tion concept, but assimilated it under the concern of arbitrary enforcement. 
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (“A vague law 
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries 
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of 
arbitrary and discriminatory application.”). No recent case has relied on the 
delegation concept as a basis for finding a law to be void for vagueness. 
 276. An influential student Note written by now-Professor Amsterdam both 
noted this and proffered an explanation as to why the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine primarily limited states rather than the federal government. See Note, 
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 
82–85 (1960). A recent article confirms that this trend has continued. See 
Goldsmith, supra note 275, at 290. 
 277. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 
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In short, Congress’s legislative power frequently is shared 
with administrative agencies and courts. 
E. THE TREATY POWER 
Professors Ackerman and Golove have shown that Con-
gress and Presidents originally believed that some internation-
al agreements only could be created by treaty, and that it was 
only in the mid-twentieth century that Congress and Presi-
dents came to believe that treaties and congressional-executive 
agreements were wholly “interchangeable;” in other words, that 
the Senate’s treaty powers and Congress’s ordinary legislative 
powers are wholly (or virtually wholly) concurrent.278 As shown 
earlier, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States takes the position that “any agreement con-
cluded as a congressional-executive agreement could also be 
concluded by treaty” and states that “[t]he prevailing view is 
that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an 
alternative to the treaty method in every instance.”279 
F. HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM: STATES’ REGULATORY 
JURISDICTION 
The trajectory from exclusivity to concurrence also is 
present in the “horizontal federalism” context with respect to 
the scope of states’ regulatory powers. The early approach, ex-
pressed by Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of 
Laws, was a strictly territorialist conception of state power that 
gave rise to exclusivity. Justice Story averred that “the laws of 
every state affect and bind directly all property . . . within its 
territory []. . . and all persons who are resident within it” and 
“no state . . . can, by its laws, directly affect or bind property 
out of its own territory, or bind persons not resident therein.”280 
On this approach, states had absolutely no power to regulate 
extraterritorially. Because each state’s power extended to its 
physical borders, and no further, each state’s regulatory powers 
were nonoverlapping and hence exclusive.  
 
U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (“[P]erhaps the most important factor affecting the clarity 
that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the 
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.”). 
 278. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 861–96 (discussing how the 
doctrine of interchangeability came to be adopted). 
 279. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e (1986). 
 280. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 18, 20 
(2d ed. 1841). 
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Early Supreme Court cases adopted similar exclusivist 
rhetoric. An 1881 decision declared that “[n]o State can legis-
late except with reference to its own jurisdiction,” meaning 
within its own physical borders, and that “[e]ach State is inde-
pendent of all the others in this particular.”281 An opinion ele-
ven years later asserted that “[l]aws have no force of them-
selves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts 
them.”282 A 1914 decision stated that “it would be impossible to 
permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdic-
tion of that State . . . without throwing down the constitutional 
barriers by which all the States are restricted within the orbits 
of their lawful authority.”283 In all these cases, the Court used 
the term “jurisdiction” interchangeably with “physical borders.” 
This exclusivist approach to state regulatory powers, how-
ever, never squared with actual practice. States early-on ap-
plied their laws to persons, transactions, and occurrences that 
laid beyond their physical borders. For example, in 1819 the 
General Court of Virginia held that a Virginia statute which 
criminalized “all felonies committed by citizen against citizen, 
in any such place” supported the Virginia Attorney General’s 
prosecution of a Virginia citizen for having stolen a fellow Vir-
ginian’s horse in the District of Columbia.284 Consider as well a 
nineteenth-century Texas law that provided that “[p]ersons out 
of the State may commit, and be liable to indictment and con-
viction for committing, any of the offenses enumerated in this 
chapter, which do not in their commission necessarily require a 
personal presence in this State.”285 Interpreting this law, an 
1882 Texas decision upheld the application of Texas’s criminal 
law to an act of forgery of a land certificate for Texas property 
 
 281. Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881). 
 282. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892). 
 283. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914). 
 284. See Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172, 174 (1819). Inte-
restingly, the Virginia court’s decision contained an important choice-of-law 
holding: what qualified as a “felony” was to be determined by Virginia law, not 
the law of the place where the activity occurred. See id. at 181. The dissenters 
in the case acknowledged that “it is competent for a State to legislate rules of 
conduct for its citizens while resident beyond its territorial limits,” but did not 
believe that the Virginia legislature had intended to create such an extraterri-
torial regulation. Id. at 183 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Virginia legislature 
modified the statute in 1819 to make clear that they did not intend to extend 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. See id. at 182 (“[T]he Legislature, in changing es-
sentially the terms of this Law, have rendered it very plain in future cases. 
They have made of it an entirely new Law.”). 
 285. 1879 Tex. Crim. Stat. 454 (emphasis added). 
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even though all the criminal acts had occurred in Louisiana.286 
The court further observed that Texas criminal law could be 
applied even if the defendants’ acts were “no crime against the 
State in which it [was] perpetrated.”287  
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court formally rec-
ognized the power of states to regulate persons and things that 
lay beyond their physical borders. In Strassheim v. Daily, the 
Court permitted Michigan to prosecute a non-Michigander for 
acts defrauding Michigan that were undertaken outside of 
Michigan.288 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes wrote that 
“[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and 
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in pu-
nishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the 
effect.”289 
Today’s restatements and model codes explicitly acknowl-
edge states’ significant extraterritorial regulatory powers. The 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States provides that states within the United States “may ap-
ply at least some laws to a person outside [State] territory on 
the basis that he is a citizen, resident, or domiciliary of the 
State.”290 The Restatement further states that this extraterrito-
riality principle applies to both criminal and civil legislative 
powers.291 Directed to the criminal context, the Model Penal 
Code provides that State A may impose liability if “the offense 
is based on a statute of this State that expressly prohibits con-
duct outside the State.”292 The Model Penal Code affirms that 
State A has extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction even if the 
 
 286. Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 289, 305–09 (1882). 
 287. Id. at 309. For more examples, see Rosen, supra note 8, at 719–20. 
 288. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 281 (1911). 
 289. Id. at 285. Thirty years later, in Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 
(1941), the Court upheld the application of a Florida statute prohibiting 
sponge fishing to a Florida citizen’s activities that occurred wholly outside of 
Florida’s territorial waters. The Skiriotes Court analogized Florida’s extrater-
ritorial regulatory powers to the unquestioned power of the federal govern-
ment to regulate its citizens when they are “upon the high seas or even in for-
eign countries,” id. at 73, and adverted to Florida’s “status of a sovereign” as 
the source of similar state extraterritorial powers. Id. at 77. 
 290. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 402 reporters’ note 5 (1986). 
 291. See id. § 403 cmt. f (“The principles governing jurisdiction to prescribe 
set forth in § 402 and in this section apply to criminal as well as to civil regu-
lation.”). 
 292. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f ) (1962). 
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activity it prohibits occurs in a State in which the activity is 
permissible.293  
The significant extent to which states can regulate extra-
territorially means that more than one state’s laws frequently 
can apply to a given person, transaction, or occurrence—
something that the Court explicitly acknowledged in 1981 when 
it wrote that “a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particu-
lar issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in constitutional terms, 
application of the law of more than one jurisdiction.”294 In the 
context of horizontal federalism, then, early exclusivist as-
sumptions also have given way to accepting that states fre-
quently have concurrent regulatory authority.295 
G. THE PARDON POWER 
The Constitution gives the President the power to grant 
pardons.296 The earliest Supreme Court opinions understood 
this grant in exclusivist terms: “To the executive alone is in-
trusted the power of pardon.”297 On the basis of this under-
standing, the Court described a statute whose provisions pur-
ported to authorize the President to grant certain pardons and 
amnesties as only a “suggestion of pardon by Congress, for such 
it was, rather than authority.”298 
Here, as elsewhere, exclusivity soon gave way to concur-
rence. At issue in Brown v. Walker was the constitutionality of 
a statute that granted immunity from prosecution, penalty, or 
forfeiture to persons who gave testimony or other evidence to 
the Interstate Commerce Commission.299 The Court held that 
“testimony,” under the statute, “operate[d] as a complete par-
don for the offense to which it relates,” and understood the con-
 
 293. See id. § 1.03(2). 
 294. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981). 
 295. To be clear, states do not enjoy plenary extraterritorial regulatory au-
thority. For example, “Alabama does not have the power . . . to punish [a com-
pany] for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had no impact on 
Alabama or its residents.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572–73 
(1996). In fact, multiple constitutional principles constrain the scope of state 
extraterritorial regulatory powers. See generally Mark D. Rosen, Extraterrito-
riality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
855, 896–945 (2002). In this context of overlapping powers, as elsewhere, con-
currency is not “all or nothing.” See infra Part IV. 
 296. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. 
 297. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871) (emphasis 
added). 
 298. Id. at 139 (emphasis added). 
 299. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 591 (1896). 
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stitutional question to be whether Congress had the power to 
issue pardons.300 Upholding the statute, the Court held that 
“[a]lthough the Constitution vests in the President ‘power to 
grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United 
States . . . ,’ this power has never been held to take from Con-
gress the power to pass acts of general amnesty.”301 The Court 
then equated amnesties with pardons, stating that “[t]he dis-
tinction between amnesty and pardon is of no practical impor-
tance. . . . [But] ‘is one rather of philological interest than of le-
gal importance.’”302 Insofar as Congress enacted the immunity 
statute pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, Brown accor-
dingly upheld an instance of same-effect concurrence.303 Justice 
Field’s dissent rejected the Court’s embrace of concurrence and 
propounded an exclusivist rationale.304 The immunity statute 
was unconstitutional, Justice Field thought, because “Congress 
cannot grant a pardon. That is an act of grace which can only 
be performed by the President.”305  
H. CONTEXTUALIZING THE TRAJECTORY: THE REMAINING 
IMPORTANCE OF EXCLUSIVITY AND SOME INSTANCES OF A 
COUNTERTRAJECTORY 
While there is a significant incidence of concurrence in 
United States law, one should not lose sight of the fact that 
many of the Constitution’s power allocations still are under-
stood exclusively. Nobody to date has suggested that any insti-
tution apart from Congress has the power to raise and support 
armies and appropriate monies for war,306 that institutions 
apart from the Senate can try impeachments,307 or that institu-
 
 300. Id. at 595. 
 301. Id. at 601 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 2). 
 302. Id. (citing Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152 (1877)).  
 303. See id. at 609–10. Though Brown rejected Klein’s exclusivist assump-
tions, the two cases are not necessarily incompatible. Brown addressed the 
question of whether Congress has the power to grant pardons, whereas Klein 
concerned the very different question of whether Congress could regulate so as 
to affect the President’s exercise of his pardon power. See id. at 593–94; Unit-
ed States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 136 (1871).  
 304. See Brown, 161 U.S. at 638 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 305. Id. (emphasis added). 
 306. Even here some concurrence-type questions have arisen. For instance: 
do the President’s executive powers include the prerogative to elect not to 
spend monies that have been allocated?  
 307. But see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (holding that 
it is a political question whether only a subset of the Senate may hear testi-
mony and submit proposed findings for a vote of the entire Senate). 
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tions apart from the President can recognize foreign coun-
tries.308 In these contexts, there has been no trajectory from ex-
clusivity to concurrence. Rather, exclusivist understandings 
have endured, and indeed have been unchallenged.  
On the other hand, the longevity of universally held exclu-
sivist assumptions does not guarantee that they will forever 
endure. Indeed, some of the most controversial proposals that 
have been put forward by contemporary scholars amount to 
suggestions that activities long thought to belong exclusively to 
one institution actually are shared concurrently with others. 
Consider in this regard Professor Bruce Ackerman’s argument 
that there are mechanisms outside of Article V by which “the 
People” can amend the Constitution, and Professor Michael 
Ramsey’s thesis that the President can declare war.309 Whether 
these particular proposals for new areas of concurrence gain 
traction remains to be seen. But many academics embrace yet 
another form of concurrence: the theory that the Supreme 
Court effectuates extra-Article V amendments by means of cre-
ative constitutional interpretation.310  
Finally, to fully understand the relation between exclusiv-
ist and concurrent power allocations in contemporary United 
States constitutionalism, one must take account of those in-
stances where there has been a countertrajectory from concur-
rence to exclusivity. There are not many such instances in con-
temporary constitutional law, but there are a few in the Court’s 
vertical federalism jurisprudence.  
The trajectory is complex. Early case law toyed with the 
exclusivist prospect that regulatory powers held by Congress 
necessarily were not also held by States.311 The Court soon 
 
 308. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 204 (1986) (“Under the Constitution of the United States, 
the President has exclusive authority to recognize or not to recognize a foreign 
state or government, and to maintain or not to maintain diplomatic relations 
with a foreign government.”). 
 309. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 266–69; Ramsey, supra note 12, at 
324. 
 310. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 13, at 1351; David A. Strauss, The Irrelev-
ance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2001). This 
is most plausibly conceptualized as a species of same-effect concurrence; Ar-
ticle III judicial power encompasses common law reasoning that has the power 
to alter constitutional meaning for all intents and purposes. See Strauss, su-
pra, at 1468.  
 311. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 200 (1824) (refusing to 
answer whether state power to regulate commerce “is surrendered by the mere 
grant to Congress, or is retained until Congress shall exercise the power. We 
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opted for same-effect concurrence, ruling that the Constitu-
tion’s grant of congressional power to regulate interstate com-
merce did not deprive states of power to regulate interstate 
commerce under their historic police powers.312 But exclusivi-
ty’s attractions had not been vanquished, for exclusivity played 
a prominent role fifty years later in the Civil Rights Cases, 
where the Court asserted that Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “does not invest Congress with power to legislate 
upon subjects which are within the domain of State legisla-
tion.”313 The grounding of this conclusion was the exclusivist 
assumption that matters falling within the regulatory authori-
ty of states perforce cannot also lie within Congress’s regulato-
ry authority.314 In later cases the Court understood Section 5 to 
authorize Congress to regulate matters that the States also had 
power to regulate,315 though the Civil Rights Cases’ doctrinal 
limits that were justified on the basis of exclusivity remain 
with us to this day.316  
A different story pertains to the Commerce Clause where, 
throughout most of the twentieth century, it was understood 
that Congress could regulate things that the states could regu-
late under their historic police powers.317 But in the recent 
 
may dismiss that inquiry, because it has been exercised . . . .”). In his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Johnson was willing to decide the question squarely in 
favor of exclusivity. See id. at 227 (Johnson, J., concurring) (“[T]he power [to 
regulate commerce] must be exclusive; it can reside but in one potentate; and 
hence, the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving noth-
ing for the State to act upon.”).  
 312. See Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251–
52 (1829). 
 313. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (relying on this argument to 
conclude that Congress was without the power to regulate private persons un-
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 314. See id. at 14–15. 
 315. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1966) (holding 
that Congress had the power under Section 5 to legislate regarding voting re-
quirements, which states unquestionably also have the power to regulate).  
 316. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620–27 (2000) (reaffirm-
ing Civil Rights Cases’ holding that Congress’s Section 5 powers extend only to 
state action, not to “private persons”). 
 317. The entire doctrine of preemption reflects this: the doctrine addresses 
whether a federal statute displaces state regulations that, before the federal 
statute’s enactment, were perfectly valid exercises of state authority. See 
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
727, 730 (2008). Preemption doctrine explicitly recognizes that federal statutes 
may displace even state regulations that fall within the states’ “historic police 
powers.” See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (noting the 
circumstances under which the “historic police powers of the States” may be 
superseded by federal law). Many (if not most) cases finding preemption in-
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Commerce Clause holdings in United States v. Lopez and Unit-
ed States v. Morrison the Supreme Court has returned to exclu-
sivity to some extent, ruling that Congress did not have power 
to regulate a particular subject because the States did have 
regulatory power.318 Dissenting, Justice Souter (joined by Jus-
tices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer) recognized and criticized 
the majority’s exclusivist assumptions, arguing that the fact 
that states have the power to regulate such matters as educa-
tion and the family says absolutely nothing about whether 
Congress also has power to regulate these subjects.319 This is 
not to suggest that the Court has retrenched to a strong form of 
exclusivity; preemption doctrine’s continuing recognition that 
Congress can regulate to displace states’ historical police pow-
ers rests on recognition of same-effect concurrence.320 Nonethe-
less, Lopez and Morrison at the very least illustrate the resi-
lience of exclusivity’s pull.  
* * * * * 
To conclude, in context after context the Supreme Court 
has begun with exclusivist assumptions only to ultimately con-
clude that more than one institution can exercise the type of 
power that the Constitution’s text appeared to grant to only a 
single specified institution. A nonexhaustive321 list follows.  
1.  The Court’s initial understanding in Marbury that the 
Supreme Court could not be given original jurisdiction beyond 
 
volve statutes enacted pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. See, 
e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992).  
 318. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–19, 626–27; United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 552–54 (1995). The case of City of Boerne v. Flores, however, is not 
properly understood as part of the countertrajectory from concurrence to ex-
clusivity. See 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). Boerne does not embrace a principle of 
exclusivity that only the Supreme Court has the power to interpret the Consti-
tution, but instead lays down a categorical rule of conflict-resolution to the ef-
fect that the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations categorically 
trump the interpretations of other institutions. See id. at 535–36. There is a 
sharp and important analytical distinction between an exclusivist rule that 
denies power to a second institution and a conflict-resolution rule. For more on 
conflict-resolution rules, see infra Part V. 
 319. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 639 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It does not at 
all follow that an activity affecting commerce nonetheless falls outside the 
commerce power, depending on . . . the authority of a State to regulate it along 
with Congress.”). 
 320. See supra note 317. 
 321. To provide yet another example, Justice Jackson’s Youngstown con-
currence expressly recognizes that presidential and congressional powers over-
lap to some extent. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
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what the Constitution granted gave way to the Ames decision, 
which permitted inferior federal courts to exercise original ju-
risdiction over matters that the Constitution had granted to the 
Supreme Court.322  
2.  The Court’s original understanding that only juries 
could find facts has been displaced by a regime in which federal 
judges and administrative judges find facts during adjudica-
tion.323 
3.  The Court’s original view that only Article III courts can 
exercise federal judicial power has given way to the under-
standing that non-Article III courts can exercise federal adjudi-
catory power.324 
4.  The original view that only Congress can exercise legis-
lative power has given way to the understanding that adminis-
trative agencies have the power to create de facto law.325 
5.  The original view that certain international obligations 
could be created only through the treaty process has given way 
to the understanding that virtually all international obligations 
can be created either by treaty or by congressional-executive 
agreements.326 
6.  The original view that each state’s regulatory authority 
extended only up to its borders has given way to the under-
standing that often more than one state has the power to regu-
late a given person, transaction, or occurrence.327 
7.  The early view that only the President can pardon has 
given way to the understanding that Congress can create func-
tionally equivalent amnesties.328 
In short, there has been a strong pattern across many doc-
trinal contexts where the Court’s initial exclusivist assump-
tions have given way to an acceptance of concurrence. The shift 
has not occurred everywhere, and sometimes has been followed 
by a retrenchment back to exclusivity.329 But, as a purely de-
scriptive matter, many important governmental powers are 
now understood to be exercisable by more than one governmen-
tal institution.  
 
 322. See supra Part II.A. 
 323. See supra Part II.B. 
 324. See supra Part II.C. 
 325. See supra Part II.D. 
 326. See supra Part II.E. 
 327. See supra Part II.F. 
 328. See supra Part II.G. 
 329. See supra Part II.H. 
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III.  HOW AND WHY CONCURRENCE IS CREATED   
This Part examines the mechanisms by which concurrence 
has been created as well as the reasons for the shift from exclu-
sivity to concurrence.  
A. MECHANISMS FOR CREATING CONCURRENCE 
As shown in Part II, the judiciary tends to start with exclu-
sivist assumptions. Consequently, the move toward concur-
rence typically has been initiated by nonjudicial institutions. 
There are three mechanisms by which concurrence has been 
created: delegation, inherency, and breach-stepping. 
1. Delegation 
The most widespread mechanism for creating concurrence 
is delegation.330 For example, Congress regularly delegates ex-
plicit rulemaking authority to agencies.331 Congress implicitly 
delegates similar authority to courts when it enacts open-ended 
statutory language and decides against tasking agencies with 
rulemaking authority to flesh out the statutory language.332 I 
will call these “Type 1 delegations.” Type 1 delegations result in 
concurrence because Congress does not divest itself of its legis-
lative power, but instead retains the power to make law as 
well. 
“Type 2 delegations” are exemplified by congressional dele-
gations of adjudicatory authority to Article I courts.333 Type 2 
delegations also result in concurrence. For instance, as shown 
in Part II.C, Article I and Article III courts share significant 
adjudicatory jurisdiction.  
Why distinguish between Type 1 and Type 2 delegations? 
In Type 1 delegations the delegator delegates its own authority, 
whereas in Type 2 delegations the delegator delegates another 
institution’s authority.334 The distinction between the two 
 
 330. Cf. Gary Lawson, Changing Images of the State: The Rise and Rise of 
the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231–39 (1994) (discussing 
the prevalence of congressional delegation and the growth of the administra-
tive state). 
 331. See supra note 248. 
 332. See Merrill, supra note 247, at 40–46. 
 333. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 1424(b) (2006) (vesting the District Court of 
Guam with “the jurisdiction of a district court of the United States . . . and 
that of a bankruptcy court of the United States”). 
 334. Compare Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164–65 (1991) (dele-
gating congressional power to designate drugs as controlled substances to the 
Attorney General), with Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 24 (1828) 
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forms of delegation may be important because institutional 
self-interest may operate as a check against overly extensive 
Type 1 delegations but not Type 2 delegations.335 On the other 
hand, self-interest sometimes may lead to excessive Type 1 del-
egations as, for instance, when Congress delegates so as to blur 
lines of political accountability.336  
Three further observations concerning delegation are in 
order. First, Congress is not the only institution that can dele-
gate. For example, the posse comitatus doctrine is an instance 
of executive delegation to the private sector; the doctrine re-
quired private citizens to assist in the enforcement of federal 
law.337 
Second, delegation is the mechanism most closely asso-
ciated with same-source concurrence. For example, executive 
agencies are readily conceptualized as exercising legislative au-
thority that has been delegated by Congress when they make 
rules.338 On the other hand, delegation does not invariably give 
rise to same-source concurrence. As we have seen, many courts 
and scholars have insisted that Article I courts do not exercise 
Article III judicial power,339 and that agencies do not exercise 
Article I legislative power.340  
Third, the propriety of a particular delegation demands 
consideration of not only the nature of the powers delegated, 
but also the identity of the delegee. In this regard, it frequently 
is easier to delegate powers to a new institution than to an in-
stitution created by the Constitution with respect to which de-
legated powers might be incompatible with its constitutional 
duties.341 
 
(delegating the authority of admiralty jurisdiction from Article III courts to 
non-Article III territorial courts). 
 335. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 2099. 
 336. See Sunstein, supra note 77, at 319–20. 
 337. See generally Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: 
Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth Century America, 26 
LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 1–11 (2008) (providing an overview of the posse comitatus 
doctrine and its application during the mid-nineteenth century in the United 
States). 
 338. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 2099. 
 339. See supra Part II.C. 
 340. See supra Part I.C.1.a.ii. 
 341. See Lawson, supra note 330, at 1240. 
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2. Inherency 
Let us call the second mechanism for creating concurrence 
“inherency.”342 Under inherency, an institution claims that its 
constitutionally granted powers authorize it to undertake act X, 
where that act is (at least) functionally identical to what anoth-
er institution can undertake. For instance, the Court has held 
that Congress’s power to regulate commerce343 subsumes the 
power to enact immunity statutes that are functionally equiva-
lent to the President’s pardon power.344 Inherency almost al-
ways gives rise to same-effect concurrence, though it theoreti-
cally can create same-source concurrence where the 
Constitution does not clearly indicate which institution is allo-
cated a particular power. For example, the Guarantee Clause 
states that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State 
in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”345 The Su-
preme Court has held that the “United States” refers to Con-
gress,346 and has suggested that the language also can encom-
pass the President.347 The Guarantee Clause accordingly may 
give rise to the rare phenomenon of inherency-created same-
source concurrence.  
3. Breach-Stepping 
The third mechanism for creating concurrence is when one 
institution with clear authority to undertake act X does not, 
and a second proactive institution “steps into the breach.”348 
Though breach-stepping typically can be described as an in-
 
 342. I borrow this excellent term from Professor Merrill. See Merrill, supra 
note 50, at 2101. 
 343. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3. 
 344. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896). 
 345. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added). 
 346. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42–44 (1849); see also Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 219–23 (1962) (explaining the Court’s holding in Luth-
er). 
 347. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 729–30 (1868) (noting 
“measures which have been taken, under [the Guarantee Clause], by the ex-
ecutive and legislative departments of the National government,” though ul-
timately concluding that “the power to carry into effect the clause of guaranty 
is primarily a legislative power, and resides in Congress”), overruled in part on 
other grounds by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885). 
 348. Justice Jackson alluded to this sort of mechanism in his Youngstown 
concurrence when he observed that “[w]e may say that power to legislate for 
emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can 
prevent power from slipping through its fingers,” and suggested that the Pres-
ident likely would act in such circumstances. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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stance of either delegation or inherency, it merits distinct 
treatment insofar as there are circumstances where the proac-
tive institution appears to be driven to act by a perceived need; 
in a breach-stepping circumstance, the proactive institution 
does not seem to be acting on the view that it is merely exercis-
ing delegated or inherent powers.  
A good illustration is provided by the facts in United States 
v. Midwest Oil Co.349 An act of Congress provided that public 
lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils were to be 
“free and open to occupation, exploration, and purchase by citi-
zens of the United States.”350 After deciding that oil was being 
extracted too rapidly, with the result that the government soon 
would be “obliged to repurchase the very oil that it ha[d] practi-
cally given away” due to the Navy’s increasing use of fuel, the 
President issued a proclamation withdrawing the rights to ex-
tract petroleum from select public lands.351  
Midwest Oil Company continued to extract oil following the 
President’s decree, and was sued for doing so.352 Midwest ar-
gued in court that the executive order was null insofar as it was 
not authorized by statute but, to the contrary, contradicted an 
act of Congress that permitted petroleum extraction.353 The 
Supreme Court upheld the President’s proclamation.354 The 
Court provided two primary justifications. One was that al-
though “no . . . express authority has been granted” to the Pres-
ident to withdraw rights to drill for oil, “there is nothing in the 
nature of the power exercised which prevents Congress from 
granting it by implication.”355 This rationale reduces to an (im-
plied) delegation justification for the President’s exercise of es-
sentially legislative powers, but it is unpersuasive: why should 
the statute opening public lands be understood as impliedly au-
thorizing the President to withdraw those lands?  
The Court’s second justification is far more compelling.356 
“[G]overnment is a practical affair, intended for practical men,” 
said the Court, and Congress’s “rules or laws for the disposal of 
 
 349. 236 U.S. 459 (1915). 
 350. Id. at 466 (quoting Act of Feb. 11, 1897, ch. 216, 29 Stat. 526, super-
seded by 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–287 (2006)). 
 351. Id. at 466–67. 
 352. Id. at 468–69. 
 353. See id. at 468. 
 354. See id. at 483. 
 355. Id. at 474. 
 356. The Court also pointed to a past practice of executive withdrawal of 
public lands. See id. at 469–72. 
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public land are necessarily general in their nature” such that 
“[e]mergencies may occur, or conditions may so change as to re-
quire that the agent in charge should, in the public interest, 
withhold the land from sale.”357 In other words, congressional 
inaction provided the justification for presidential initiative. 
Though this could be redescribed as an instance of inherency—
that executive authority encompasses the power to deviate 
from general legislative dictates when necessary—the Court 
did not justify the President’s actions in such terms.358 
Breach-stepping is the mechanism that has given rise to 
the concurrent rulemaking authority as between Congress and 
federal courts that characterizes the dormant Commerce 
Clause. Congress has unquestioned authority to disallow (or 
approve) all the state regulations that federal courts have 
deemed presumptively unlawful under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.359 The Supreme Court has not yet pointed to a persua-
sive doctrinal basis in which to ground its dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine,360 so why has the Court proceeded to generate 
federal common law in this area? The most likely answer is 
that the Court deems federal inaction in the face of discrimina-
tory state laws to be unacceptable, and so it has stepped into 
the breach of congressional inaction and taken the initiative.361  
The same can be said of federal common law itself. Al-
though federal common law-making plausibly can be justified 
on inherency grounds—on the theory that Article III’s judicial 
power encompasses common law-making powers362 over mat-
 
 357. Id. at 474.  
 358. The Court refused to endorse the President’s effort to ground his pow-
ers to issue the Proclamation in his Commander-in-Chief powers. See id. at 
468. Additionally, much of the Court’s reasoning seemed to turn on the fact 
that the case concerned public lands. See id. at 474–75. For an illuminating 
analysis of the case, see Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Pres-
idency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (1993). 
 359. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). 
 360. See Camps Newfound v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610–18 
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 361. See id. at 618–20. 
 362. I would add the caveat that federal courts’ common law-making pow-
ers exist only to the extent that they were not statutorily preempted, as it 
were, by the Rules of Decision Act. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Common 
Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” 
Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 795 (1989). This suggests that the Court’s 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is harder to justify than run-of-the-
mill federal common law insofar as dormant Commerce Clause doctrine oper-
ates as federal law where state law otherwise would seem to be appropriately 
applied under the Rules of Decision Act. See id.  
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ters that do not lie within the competency of states363—what 
actually has driven the Court to create federal common law is 
better described as breach-stepping than as inherency. After 
all, even after the embrace of legal positivism in Erie Railroad 
v. Tompkins, which made it important to identify the source of 
judges’ power to generate common law,364 the Supreme Court 
typically neglects to specify the source of the federal common 
law rules it announces and instead justifies its common law-
making on the grounds of necessity. For example, in Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, one of the first post-Erie federal 
common law cases, the Court held that “[t]he rights and duties 
of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are 
governed by federal rather than local law.”365 Explaining that 
“[i]n the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the 
federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to 
their own standards,” the Court failed to explain the source of 
federal courts’ power to fashion law absent congressional ac-
tion.366 Similarly, in a decision handed down the same day as 
Erie, Justice Brandeis wrote that the apportionment of an in-
terstate stream’s water presents a “question of ‘federal common 
law.’”367 Brandeis cited to earlier cases for the principle, but 
neither he nor the cited cases explained the source of federal 
courts’ powers to create such federal common law—an essential 
issue following Erie’s embrace of positivism.368  
 
 363. In other words, the rule first announced in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938), perhaps is best understood as a federalism doctrine rather 
than a doctrine that addresses the nature of federal judicial power. Federal 
courts have common law authority, except in diversity cases where state law 
provides the substantive rule of decision. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: 
The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 922–24 (1986) 
(making a similar argument). 
 364. Prior to Erie, common law was widely understood as being judicial ar-
ticulation of preexisting natural law rather than judicial creation. See Erie, 
304 U.S. at 79 (asserting that Swift v. Tyson’s sanctioning of federal courts’ 
common law powers rested on the “fallac[ious]” natural law belief that there is 
a “transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory 
within it unless and until changed by statute”). But see Jack Goldsmith & Ste-
ven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673, 683 
(1998) (challenging this account). If, following Erie, there was no “transcen-
dental body” of law that courts merely declared when they announced common 
law, then what was the source of the common law rule that a federal court de-
clared? 
 365. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943). 
 366. Id. at 366–67. 
 367. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 
110 (1938). 
 368. See id. Though some lower courts and modern commentators similarly 
  
1120 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:1051 
 
To be sure, in some contexts the Court has attempted to 
explain the source of its powers to generate federal common 
law. Yet even here it is hard to escape the conclusion that a 
perceived need to act, rather than firm belief in its inherent 
powers, drove the Court’s decision because its inherency justifi-
cations have been remarkably flimsy. First consider the federal 
common law of admiralty and interstate conflicts. The Court 
has said that the source of federal courts’ authority to generate 
admiralty law is the Constitution’s “grant of general admiralty 
jurisdiction to the federal courts.”369 As many have observed, 
however, this justification is inconsistent with Erie’s holding 
that the Constitution’s grant of diversity jurisdiction does not 
empower federal courts to create general common law in diver-
sity cases insofar as “there is no obviously relevant difference 
in the texts of the diversity and admiralty jurisdictional 
grants.”370 In other words, if the diversity grant gives courts ad-
judicatory jurisdiction but not the power to fashion substantive 
common law rules, why should the admiralty grant operate dif-
ferently? 
Consider, as well, the Court’s holding in Textile Workers 
Union v. Lincoln Mills371 that federal courts’ powers to create a 
body of federal law to enforce collective bargaining agreements 
came from the Labor Management Relations Act’s (LMRA) pro-
vision stating that federal courts have jurisdiction over “[s]uits 
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization . . . in an industry affecting commerce.”372 Fairly 
read, this statutory provision is a jurisdictional grant—which 
the Court acknowledged.373 Reliance on a jurisdictional grant 
as the source of a court’s power to generate federal common law 
 
have sought to ground federal common law-making power in the Constitu-
tion’s jurisdictional grant over interstate controversies, see RICHARD H. FAL-
LON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 732–43 (5th ed. 2003) (gathering sources), the same Erie-based criti-
que leveled at the Court’s reliance on the Admiralty Jurisdiction Clause ap-
plies here. If the diversity grant gives courts adjudicatory jurisdiction but not 
the power to fashion substantive common law rules, why should the interstate 
controversy grant operate differently? 
 369. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95–
96 (1981). 
 370. Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 312 
(1999).  
 371. 353 U.S. 448, 451–52 (1957). 
 372. Id. at 449–50 (relying on 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006)). 
 373. Id. at 452 (stating the question before the Court as being whether the 
statutory provision at issue is “more than jurisdictional”). 
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accordingly is subject to the same sort of post-Erie critique le-
veled against the Court’s federal common law of admiralty: why 
should the LMRA’s jurisdictional grant be the source of com-
mon law powers if the diversity grant is not?374 Lincoln Mills 
also relied on what Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court 
termed “a few shafts of light” in the legislative history to but-
tress its conclusion,375 but “[t]he Court’s handling of the legisla-
tive history was severely criticized by the dissent and, subse-
quently, by commentators.”376  
In all these cases, breach-stepping rather than inherency 
better describes what prompted the Court’s decision to go for-
ward with federal common law-making and thereby create con-
currency. 
B. REASONS FOR CONCURRENCE 
This subpart explains why there has been a shift from ex-
clusivity to concurrence in so many contexts. The analysis be-
gins by exploring the Court’s explanations, all of which have 
stressed situation-specific pragmatic considerations. Frequent-
ly, the Court also was able to point either to historical prece-
dents or to the fact that the practice of concurrence had become 
deeply entrenched.  
The Court’s pragmatic explanations, however, typically do 
not venture beyond relatively undeveloped assertions that con-
currence is practical or efficient in the circumstance at hand. 
Concurrence’s benefits can be further cashed out. Not limiting 
analysis to the justifications provided in the case law seems 
particularly appropriate in view of the fact that concurrence 
typically originates extrajudicially. By analyzing concurrence 
as a phenomenon that occurs across multiple doctrinal con-
texts, rather than confining analysis to only one context at a 
time, one can find recurring patterns as to what concurrence 
can accomplish.  
1. Pragmatics and Past Practice 
The Ames Court, it should be recalled, reversed course 
from Marbury and upheld Congress’s allocation of original ju-
risdiction to inferior federal courts of cases involving states and 
 
 374. See supra note 368 (noting a similar critique that can be leveled at the 
various efforts that have been made to explain federal courts’ powers to create 
federal common law to resolve interstate controversies). 
 375. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 452. 
 376. Merrill, supra note 247, at 40 & nn.180–81. 
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ambassadors.377 It premised its holding on the basis of 
longstanding practice and practicality.378 Ames reasoned on the 
basis of an analogous practice that had arisen in relation to in-
ferior federal courts’ jurisdiction over cases involving ambassa-
dors.379 The same section of the Constitution that grants the 
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over suits involving states 
provides that “the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdic-
tion . . . [i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors.”380 Since the ear-
ly days of our Republic, however, this language has not been 
understood to mean that only the Supreme Court has original 
jurisdiction in cases affecting Ambassadors. The 1789 Judiciary 
Act provided that the Supreme Court “‘shall have exclusively 
all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassa-
dors’” but “‘original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all suits 
brought by ambassadors . . . .’”381 The Court specifically noted 
that this legislation reflected Congress’s “construction” of the 
Constitution,382 and the Court provided a practical rationale for 
Congress’s “understand[ing] that the original jurisdiction 
vested in the Supreme Court was [not] necessarily exclu-
sive”383: 
[K]eep[ing] open the highest court of the nation for the determination, 
in the first instance, of suits involving . . . a diplomat or commercial 
 
 377. See supra Part II.A. 
 378. See Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 469 (1883) (noting Congress’s 
“practical construction” of the provision and that “no court of the United 
States has ever in its actual adjudications determined” that the provision did 
not confer concurrent jurisdiction). Tellingly, the Ames Court did not distin-
guish Marbury on the basis of the Constitution’s specification that “[i]n all 
other Cases, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction.” See U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). It quite plausibly could have been 
argued on the basis of this language that the Supreme Court could not have 
original jurisdiction over matters for which the Constitution granted it appel-
late jurisdiction. 
 379. See Ames, 111 U.S. at 463–64 (noting that the Judiciary Act of 1789 
provided the Supreme Court with concurrent jurisdiction over suits brought by 
ambassadors). 
 380. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 381. Ames, 111 U.S. at 463–64 (quoting the Judiciary Act of 1789) (empha-
sis added). 
 382. Id. at 464. The Ames Court also observed that this construction was 
provided by “the first Congress, in which were many who had been leading 
and influential members of the convention, and who were familiar with the 
discussions that preceded the adoption of the Constitution by the States and 
with the objections urged against it.” Id. This raises an obvious question: 
shouldn’t these same considerations have led the Court to decide Marbury dif-
ferently? 
 383. Id. 
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representative of a foreign government . . . was due to the rank and 
dignity of those for whom the [constitutional] provision was made; but 
to . . . deprive an ambassador, public minister or consul of the privi-
lege of suing in any court he chose having jurisdiction of the parties 
and the subject matter of his action, would be, in many cases, to con-
vert what was intended as a favor into a burden.384 
The Ames Court also was impressed that this longstanding 
practice was popularly accepted.385  
Likewise, the Supreme Court and commentators386 have 
acknowledged that considerations of practicality drove the 
Court’s jurisprudence upholding concurrent power as between 
Article I tribunals and Article III courts. Justice Harlan’s deci-
sion for the Court in the Glidden Co. v. Zdanok387 decision is 
exemplary. Justice Harlan traced non-Article III federal courts 
back to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in the above-discussed 
Canter case, which upheld a territorial court’s power to hear a 
case that also fell under Article III admiralty jurisdiction.388 
Applauding Canter’s holding, Harlan said “[t]he reasons for 
[Canter’s holding] are not difficult to appreciate so long as the 
character of the early territories and some of the practical prob-
lems arising from their administration are kept in mind.”389 
There was “no state government to assume the burden of local 
regulation,” with the result that “courts had to be established 
and staffed with sufficient judges to handle the general juris-
diction that elsewhere would have been exercised in large part 
by the courts of a State.”390 It was imperative that these terri-
torial courts not be staffed by life-tenured Article III judges be-
 
 384. Id. 
 385. See id. at 465–66. Ames noted that one of the opinions was contempo-
raneous with the decision of Chisholm v. Georgia, which famously caused im-
mediate controversy and led to the quick adoption of the Eleventh Amend-
ment. “It is a fact of some significance, in this connection, that although the 
decision in [Chisholm] attracted immediate attention, and caused great irrita-
tion in some of the states,” that the decisions concerning ambassadors, “which 
in effect held that the original jurisdiction of the supreme court was not neces-
sarily exclusive, seems to have provoked no special comment.” Id. at 466.  
 386. See Bator, supra note 215, at 254 (“The justification for the existence 
of territorial courts has always been essentially pragmatic.”); Monaghan, su-
pra note 26, at 868 (“The expanding national government and the rapidly ex-
panding national domain quickly rendered [exclusivity] untenable.”). 
 387. 370 U.S. 530, 584 (1962) (holding that the Court of Claims and the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are Article III courts). 
 388. Id. at 544 (“The concept of a legislative court derives from the opinion 
of Chief Justice Marshall in [Canter], dealing with courts established in a ter-
ritory.” (citation omitted)). 
 389. Id. at 545 (emphasis added). 
 390. Id. 
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cause there would have been no need for them after the territo-
ries became states and created their own (state) courts.  
This consideration, as well as other “problems not foreseen 
by the Framers of Article III,” Justice Harlan says, explained 
Canter: “Against this historical background, it is hardly sur-
prising that Chief Justice Marshall decided as he did. It would 
have been doctrinaire in the extreme”391 to rule otherwise. In-
stead, continued Harlan, Chief Justice Marshall was “conscious 
as ever of his responsibility to see the Constitution work” and 
accordingly “recognized a greater flexibility in Congress to deal 
with problems arising outside the normal context of a federal 
system.”392 Harlan then generalized, explaining that “[t]he 
same confluence of practical considerations that dictated the 
result in Canter has governed the decisions in later cases sanc-
tioning the creation of other courts with judges of limited te-
nure” and that otherwise do not conform to the requirements of 
Article III.393 
The Court also has relied on historical practice and prac-
tical considerations in its other decisions upholding non-Article 
III tribunals. In the landmark case of Murray’s Lessee v. Hobo-
ken Land & Improvement Co., for instance, the Court upheld 
the non-Article III procedure for collecting federal taxes on the 
historical grounds that it did “not differ in principle from those 
employed in England from remote antiquity—and in many of 
the States, so far as we know without objection.”394 The Court 
then explained the pragmatic basis for this practice: 
[P]robably there are few governments which do or can permit their 
claims for public taxes, either on the citizen or the officer employed 
for their collection or disbursement, to become subjects of judicial con-
troversy, according to the course of the law of the land. Imperative ne-
cessity has forced a distinction between such claims and all oth-
ers . . . .395 
The nation’s courts-martial similarly have been justified on 
the basis of historical practice and practicality. Emphasizing 
the former, the early decision of Dynes v. Hoover concluded that 
“Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punish-
ment of military and naval offences in the manner then and 
 
 391. Id. at 546 (emphasis added). 
 392. Id. at 547. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 281 (1855); see also supra Part II.C (laying out the facts of this case 
in detail). 
 395. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 282 (emphasis added). 
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now practiced by civilized nations.”396 Emphasizing considera-
tions of practicality, Ex parte Quirin rejected the view that of-
fenses against the laws of war are subject to the requirements 
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, holding instead that such 
offenses can be tried in military tribunals, “which are not 
courts in the sense of the Judiciary Article, and which in the 
natural course of events are usually called upon to function un-
der conditions precluding resort to such procedures.”397 Consis-
tent with Ex parte Quirin, the landmark decision of Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld candidly acknowledged that “[t]he military commis-
sion, a tribunal neither mentioned in the Constitution nor 
created by statute, was born of military necessity.”398 
Sometimes pragmatic considerations alone, absent histori-
cal pedigree, have proven to be sufficient justification for the 
Court. Consider in this regard its forgiving nondelegation doc-
trine. As the Court has said in its more candid moments, “[O]ur 
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding 
that in our increasingly complex society . . . Congress simply 
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power.”399 This 
justification has been elaborated and defended by multiple 
scholars.400  
2. Efficiency 
Pragmatics without pedigree has been a sufficient justifica-
tion for concurrence in the Court’s Seventh Amendment juris-
prudence examined above in Part II.B. The judicial decisions 
allowing concurrent fact-finding powers between judge and jury 
were driven primarily by considerations of efficiency and re-
 
 396. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857). 
 397. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942) (citations omitted). 
 398. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590 (2006). 
 399. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Loving v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) (“To burden Congress with all federal 
rulemaking would divert that branch from more pressing issues, and defeat 
the Framers’ design of a workable National Government.”); Am. Power & 
Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (“The judicial approval accorded 
these ‘broad’ standards for administrative action is a reflection of the necessi-
ties of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social prob-
lems.”). 
 400. Merrill, supra note 50, at 2151–59, 2164–65 (summarizing the argu-
ments in support of broad delegation powers and concluding that agencies are 
“far better” at making federal policy on “many and perhaps most issues”); 
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 57, at 1743–45 (“All institutions must take di-
rection from a person, or a small group of people, but the leader of an institu-
tion cannot possibly perform all of its tasks directly. Instead, the leader or 
principal delegates broad authority to agents.”). 
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source preservation. The Munson decision, which rejected the 
rule under which questions were submitted to the jury as long 
as there was “any evidence,” justified its new approach by cit-
ing to “recent decisions of high authority” that “have estab-
lished a more reasonable rule.”401 The “high authority” that the 
Supreme Court cited all were English cases that postdated 
1791, the year that the Seventh Amendment was adopted, and 
hence were not legally binding authority.402 Moreover, none of 
the cases went so far as to support the Court’s rule that judges 
can “take cases away from the jury when there are disputes of 
pure questions of fact.”403 The conclusion is inescapable that 
what ultimately led the Supreme Court to adopt its new rule in 
Munson was its belief that the new rule was—as the Court it-
self said—“more reasonable” than the old one: why let a case go 
to the jury, even if there were some evidence in support of the 
plaintiff ’s position, if a jury could not “properly proceed to find 
a verdict” for the nonmoving party?404 Doing so would only 
waste the valuable time of the court, jury, and parties.405  
The Galloway decision, which determined that directed 
verdicts on grounds of insufficiency of evidence did not violate 
the Seventh Amendment, likewise grounded its holding on con-
siderations of practice and practicality. The “short answer” as 
to why “the Amendment [does not] deprive[] the federal courts 
of power to direct a verdict for insufficiency of evidence,” ex-
plained the Court, is that any contention to the contrary “has 
been foreclosed by repeated decisions made here consistently 
for nearly a century” with the result that any “objection there-
fore comes too late.”406 But the Galloway Court did not end its 
analysis there, as it also aimed to establish that “the conse-
quences flowing from” the proposition that a judge’s only re-
sponse to insufficient evidence was to order a new trial “are suf-
ficient to refute it.”407 The conclusion that the Seventh 
Amendment demanded a new trial after the plaintiff had failed 
to provide sufficient evidence in the first, said the Court, would 
 
 401. Schuylkill & Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 
442, 448 (1871) (emphasis added). 
 402. See Sward, supra note 140, at 594 (noting that the earliest of these 
cases had been decided in 1853). 
 403. Id. at 599. 
 404. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 448 (emphasis added). 
 405. See Pa. R.R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 343 (1933) (“Such a prac-
tice . . . saves time and expense . . . .”). 
 406. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389 (1943). 
 407. Id. at 392. 
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lead to “endless repetition of litigation and unlimited chance, 
by education gained at the opposing party’s expense, for per-
fecting a case at other trials.”408  
Sometimes considerations of practicality alone—despite 
the absence of longstanding practice and, sometimes, even con-
trary to longstanding practice—have been sufficient to moti-
vate the Court to accept concurrence. Consider in this regard 
the Redman Court’s decision that a federal court could disre-
gard a jury’s verdict and substitute its own by granting an im-
mediate verdict on behalf of the party who had lost in the jury’s 
eyes.409 Unlike Munson and Galloway, the Redman Court was 
unable to justify its new rule on grounds of past practice be-
cause the Court only twenty years earlier, in the Slocum case, 
had flatly rejected the proposition that Redman embraced.410  
Remarkably, Slocum notwithstanding, the Redman Court 
labored to demonstrate that its holding was consistent with 
precedent. This effort is not at all convincing.411 Since the legal 
 
 408. Id. at 393. 
 409. See Balt. & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 661 (1935) (“[W]e 
reach the conclusion that the judgment of reversal for the error in denying the 
motions should embody a direction for a judgment of dismissal on the merits, 
and not for a new trial.”); see also supra note 167. 
 410. See Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 380 (1913) (“When the 
verdict was set aside the issues of fact were left undetermined, and . . . no 
judgment on the merits could be given. The new determination . . . could be 
had only through a new trial, with the same right to a jury as before.”). In-
deed, the Second Circuit decision that the Supreme Court’s ruling reversed in 
Redman had relied on Slocum for the proposition that a new trial was the only 
remedy for a judge’s determination that a jury’s verdict had been based on in-
sufficient evidence. See Redman, 295 U.S. at 656 (“But the court of appeals 
ruled that under our decision in Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. the 
direction must be for a new trial.” (footnote omitted)). The Supreme Court in 
the Redman decision itself acknowledged that “some parts of the [Slocum] 
opinion give color to the interpretation put on it by the Court of Appeals.” Id. 
at 661. This is an understatement: as explained in Part II.B, Slocum had cited 
to many earlier-decided Supreme Court cases that had flatly asserted that on-
ly juries could make the ultimate determinations as to facts that ground the 
verdict.  
 411. See Redman, 295 U.S. at 659–60 (distinguishing Slocum). Redman’s 
holding turned on a highly technical distinction. Unlike Slocum, the defendant 
in Redman had moved for a directed verdict on the grounds of insufficient evi-
dence after evidence had been adduced at trial but before the verdict was ren-
dered, and the trial court had reserved its decision on the defendant’s motion. 
The Redman Court then pointed to the common law procedure known as the 
“special case,” under which courts could submit the case to the jury subject to 
reserved questions of law and, following the verdict, award the verdict to a dif-
ferent party than the jury depending upon how the court resolved the reserved 
question. Id. at 659–60. 
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materials before the Redman Court alone cannot explain its de-
cision, the efficiency-minded practical reasons the Court ad-
duced most likely are what fueled its decision. Like other prac-
tices that had been approved, allowing the judge to disregard a 
jury’s verdict and grant an immediate verdict would give “bet-
ter opportunity for considered rulings, ma[ke] new trials less 
frequent” and for these reasons could be expected to “com-
mand[] . . . general approval” of litigants over time.412  
3. Circumstances Not Anticipated by the Founders 
In several contexts, the Court has justified concurrence on 
the ground that it was necessary to meet circumstances not an-
ticipated by our Constitution’s Founders. Justice Harlan justi-
fied Article I courts on this basis, explaining that they were ne-
cessary to meet “problems not foreseen by the Framers of 
Article III.”413 Administrative agencies’ rulemaking powers si-
milarly have been justified on the ground that “in our increa-
singly complex society . . . Congress simply cannot do its job ab-
sent an ability to delegate power.”414 Scholars arguing in favor 
of congressional-executive agreements have argued that the 
Founders did not anticipate exactly how difficult the treaty 
process would be, or the prominent role that the United States 
would play on the international stage.415 Similar arguments 
have been proffered as to the unanticipated difficulty of Article 
V’s amendment requirements to explain de facto amendments 
by the Court via constitutional interpretation.416  
 
 412. Id. at 660. 
 413. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 546 (1962). 
 414. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Loving v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 
U.S. 90, 105 (1946). 
 415. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 34, at 861–96 (describing the con-
flict that arose between isolationists and internationalists prior to and during 
World War II as the result of the Senate’s “monopoly” on foreign policy). 
 416. See, e.g., Thomas Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case 
for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 824 (2005) (“[T]he 
American Constitution . . . contains no adequate mechanism for making 
needed changes in the assignment of powers between the levels of govern-
ment. . . . [T]he solution . . . has been judicial amendments of the Constitution 
. . . .”); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 
1514 (2009) (“[O]ur practice of judicial interpretation uses Article III to work 
around the obstruction to good governance produced by the difficult amend-
ment procedures of Article V.”).  
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4. Workarounds 
Concurrence has been turned to as a workaround because 
the institution most obviously tasked by the Constitution has 
not acted.417 Sometimes there are obvious practical barriers 
that account for the most suitable candidate’s inaction. For in-
stance, in theory, Congress could enact as legislation every 
administrative agency’s rule. Given the size of the country to-
day and the perceived need for the federal government’s in-
volvement, however, this simply is not possible. 
Sometimes concurrence has been created when it is less 
obvious why the most obviously tasked institution has failed to 
act. Consider in this regard the federal courts’ dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine and federal common law.418 As discussed 
in the next subpart, however, considerations of the different in-
stitutional characteristics of courts and legislatures may help 
to explain why courts rather than Congress have acted here. 
Finally, and most controversial of all, concurrence occasio-
nally has been used to avoid constitutional limitations that 
hindered the most obvious institution from undertaking a par-
ticular task. Consider in this regard Professor Pfander’s discus-
sion of the Article I tribunal known as the Court of Claims.419 
When the colonies were settled, a private party (such as con-
tractors and other public creditors) who had a “public claim” 
against government would submit petitions for payment direct-
ly to the legislature.420 “Shortly after the Revolution, states be-
gan to experiment with the judicial determination of public 
claims.”421 Congress wished to meld these two practices togeth-
er by having courts take the first crack at public claims, but re-
taining ultimate control in deciding what public claims to ulti-
mately authorize.422 The Invalid Pensions Act of 1792 required 
 
 417. After writing this Article, I came across a piece written by Mark 
Tushnet that addresses a similar phenomenon by means of the identical ter-
minology. See Tushnet, supra note 416. 
 418. See supra notes 359–76 and accompanying text. 
 419. See Pfander, supra note 22, at 699–706 (arguing that the creation of 
the Court of Claims was driven by the Supreme Court’s refusal to submit deci-
sions of the courts to executive or legislative review). 
 420. See id. at 701 (“Contractors and other public creditors would submit 
legislative petitions for payment, which were funneled to the proper committee 
of the assembly; if favorably impressed, the committee would recommend in-
clusion of payment in the annual appropriations bill.”). 
 421. See id. 
 422. See id. at 699 (describing the claims process imposed by the Invalid 
Pensions Act of 1792). 
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Article III courts to “hear the pension claims of veterans, to es-
timate the degree of their disability, and to propose the proper 
amount of compensation due them.”423 The federal court’s esti-
mates thereafter were to be “review[ed] first by the Secretary of 
War and then by Congress.”424  
However, the Court in Hayburn’s Case strongly disap-
proved of this mechanism of initial judicial review followed by 
executive and legislative review, and argued that Article III re-
quires that the judiciary’s decisions be final in the sense of not 
being reviewable by nonjudicial institutions.425 Hayburn’s 
Case’s finality requirement led Congress to create the non-
Article III Court of Claims in 1855.426 “In creating the Court of 
Claims, Congress was said to have created an Article I tribunal 
subject to legislative oversight and free from the constraints of 
Article III.”427 As Pfander nicely puts it, Hayburn’s Case “pur-
chased judicial independence at the price of forcing Congress to 
turn to other institutions to perform the function of preliminary 
adjudication.”428 The Court of Claims is not unique in this re-
gard; other non-Article III tribunals were created to circumvent 
other Article III requirements.429  
Such a use of concurrence presents difficult legitimacy 
challenges: was the Court of Claims a brilliant workaround, or 
an unconstitutional end-run around Article III’s finality re-
quirement? I return to this query in Part VI.430 
 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. 
 425. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 409 n.(a) (1792) (“‘[B]y the 
constitution, neither the secretary at war, nor any other executive officer, nor 
even the legislature, are authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial 
acts or opinions of this court.’” (quoting the Circuit Court for the District of 
New York)). 
 426. See Pfander, supra note 22, at 703–04 (“By disclaiming an advisory or 
preliminary role in the determination of benefit claims, the federal courts re-
quired Congress to fashion a non-Article III tribunal for the adjudication of 
such claims.”). 
 427. Id. at 702–03. 
 428. Id. at 702.  
 429. See id. at 706–15 (arguing that Congress originally created non-
Article III territorial courts because it believed that inhabitants of territories 
“lacked federal rights to enforce” and that territorial courts were local rather 
than national courts). 
 430. See infra note 501. 
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5. Interinstitutional Synergies 
Although only occasionally justified in these terms, concur-
rence frequently arises in circumstances where the characteris-
tics of the overlapping institutions are complementary such 
that concurrence likely results in superior decision making and 
action taking than exclusivity would. The Midwest Oil decision 
is a rare instance where the Court justified concurrence in 
terms of such institutional synergies.431 As discussed above, the 
Court upheld the President’s decision to bar mineral extraction 
from public lands, despite a statute that permitted such extrac-
tion, on the ground that “[e]mergencies may occur, or condi-
tions may so change as to require that the agent in charge 
should, in the public interest, withhold the land from sale.”432 
Two institutional characteristics explain why the President is 
better situated to respond to emergencies than Congress. First, 
Congress primarily operates prospectively, enacting statutes 
that have enduring effects, whereas the executive branch gen-
erally operates in the present, applying past congressional 
enactments to present-day events. Call this the executive 
branch’s “presentist” orientation. For these reasons, the Presi-
dent is better positioned than Congress to respond to changed 
circumstances and emergencies. Second, the President can act 
much faster than our bicameral, 535-member national legisla-
ture.  
Courts and commentators point to similar institutional 
synergies in relation to agency rulemaking. Agencies bring a 
level of substantive expertise and deep experience that Con-
gress cannot.433 Furthermore, since it is cheaper and easier to 
modify agency rules than statutes,434 rules can more readily be 
 
 431. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) 
(upholding a presidential proclamation withdrawing petroleum extraction 
rights on select public lands). 
 432. Id. It is worth adding that the Court refused to endorse the Presi-
dent’s effort to ground his powers to issue the proclamation on his Command-
er-in-Chief powers. See id. at 468 (noting that the government argued that the 
President’s proclamation was grounded in his power “as Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy,” but deciding the issue on other grounds). Much of the 
Court’s reasoning arguably turned on the fact that the case concerned public 
lands. See id. at 474–75. For an illuminating analysis of the Midwest Oil 
precedent, see Monaghan, supra note 358, at 44–45. 
 433. For a comprehensive discussion of the relative institutional competen-
cies of agencies and Congress, see Merrill, supra note 317. 
 434. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTI-
TUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 95–97 (1994) (arguing that 
the comparative complexity of rulemaking increases information costs, reduc-
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tailored to account for unanticipated effects and changed cir-
cumstances—yet another facet of the executive branch’s pre-
sentist orientation.  
Much federal common law also can be understood through 
the lens of institutional synergy. To see this, it is necessary to 
disaggregate federal common law. First consider contexts 
where federal courts have engaged in wholesale lawmaking 
with virtually no congressional participation, as in admiralty, 
interstate controversies,435 and (with the close conceptual rela-
tive to federal common law known as) dormant Commerce 
Clause cases.436 This phenomenon of courts taking the first step 
may occur in fields that are better-suited to inductive, ground-
up reasoning than the legislature’s more deductive process of 
laying down prospective general principles. Inductive reasoning 
can be expected to be a better method where it is difficult to an-
ticipate the relevant decision-making criteria on an ex ante ba-
sis, or where there is uncertainty as to how multiple competing 
considerations ought to be prioritized.437 In these contexts, leg-
islatures either never intervene (but instead leave the field to 
courts) or later codify (and frequently amend) the Court’s initial 
resolutions. Either way, there is good reason to believe that the 
ultimate outcomes will be better than what would have re-
sulted if the courts had not first acted.  
Institutional synergies also are found in the facet of federal 
common law that consists of filling significant gaps in a statu-
tory scheme. As with the executive’s relationship to Congress 
discussed above, the institutional synergy in this context re-
 
ing participation in rulemaking and lowering the cost of influencing out-
comes). 
 435. It should be noted, though, that Congress may not have power to de-
cide all interstate controversies. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: 
A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1323–26 (1996) (sug-
gesting that Congress could not enact a statute to decide the boundaries be-
tween two states). 
 436. Henry Monaghan was among the first to point out the close relation-
ship between federal common law and the dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1975) (noting that “one of the most salient illustrations of 
the Supreme Court’s derivation of federal rules of decision from the Constitu-
tion” is the invalidation of state laws under the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 437. There is an extensive literature that addresses the choice between in-
ductive and deductive decision making. See generally Richard A. Posner, Legal 
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Consti-
tution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987) (using the concepts of deductive 
and inductive reasoning to help define the terms “legal formalism” and “legal 
realism”).  
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sults from the judiciary’s more presentist orientation vis-à-vis 
legislatures. Whereas legislatures operate prospectively, inva-
riably suffering from imperfect foresight, courts operate on the 
front lines, hearing live controversies. Consequently, courts are 
regularly presented with scenarios unanticipated by legisla-
tures and, relatedly, with the need to harmonize apparently 
conflicting legal duties. Although legislatures have the power to 
create as statutes the rules that courts fashion as federal com-
mon law in such circumstances, it may be advantageous to al-
low courts to take the first crack rather than leaving the gap 
unfilled until Congress acts. Congress can always amend the 
Court’s efforts, if it should so choose. 
6. Emergencies 
Finally, concurrence occasionally has been justified on the 
ground that an emergency required either immediate action or 
a deviation from ordinary institutional arrangements. Justice 
Holmes upheld an administrative agency’s assumption of jury 
fact-finding duties in Block v. Hirsh on the basis of the latter 
justification—remedying the District of Columbia’s housing 
shortage required fast action that only administrative fact-
finding could accomplish.438 And though the Court equivocated, 
it may have upheld President Lincoln’s issuance of a proclama-
tion appointing a provisional governor of Texas following the 
Civil War and providing for the assembling of a convention to 
adopt a new state constitution on the ground that immediate 
action was necessary.439 The danger exists, of course, that the 
emergency giving rise to the exception will be forgotten and the 
 
 438. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921) (“A part of the exigency is 
to secure a speedy and summary administration of the law and we are not 
prepared to say that the suspension of ordinary remedies was not a reasonable 
provision of a statute reasonable in its aim and intent.”). 
 439. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 730 (1868), overruled in part 
on other grounds by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885). The Court 
said such actions “primarily” fell under Congress’s “legislative power” under 
the Guarantee Clause, but then stated that the President’s actions were ap-
propriately “considered as provisional” in light of the fact that it was “taken 
after the term of the 38th Congress had expired.” Id. Elsewhere in the opinion, 
the Court suggested that the President may have some independent powers 
under the Guarantee Clause. See id. at 729 (determining that it was unneces-
sary to review the actions taken “by the executive and legislative depart-
ments” under the Guarantee Clause, and noting that it is “essential only that 
the means must be necessary and proper” to restoring a republican form of 
government, and that no action be taken “which is either prohibited or un-
sanctioned by the Constitution”). 
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exception generalized. As explained above, that in fact is what 
occurred with the Block case.440 
IV.  NOT ALL OR NOTHING   
There is a chapter in the Hebrew Bible that consists of only 
two sentences.441 The lesson: sometimes short but important 
points deserve to be broken out on their own so they receive the 
emphasis they deserve.  
So too here. The choice between exclusivity and concur-
rence is not an “all or nothing” affair. This is true in two key 
respects.  
First, though there are many instances of concurrence, 
there also are many contexts where power is held exclusively 
by a single institution.442  
Second, even where concurrence exists, there typically are 
limits. For example, although federal courts have significant 
power to create federal common law—and where they have this 
power they accordingly share de facto lawmaking powers with 
Congress—their common law-making powers are not cotermin-
ous with Congress’s lawmaking powers or with the federal 
courts’ adjudicatory jurisdiction. Instead, there are all sorts of 
(judge-made) limits that have been imposed or identified.443 
Similarly, in the context of Article I courts, the Supreme Court 
has labored to identify the limits to Congress’s powers to task 
non-Article III courts with the sort of adjudicatory business 
that falls within Article III jurisdiction.444 As well, the Presi-
dent’s “lawmaking” powers are limited to circumstances where 
Congress has delegated to him rulemaking authority or, as the 
great Steel Seizure case makes clear, the President has inde-
pendent powers and Congress has not acted.445  
The lesson that emerges from the fact that the choice be-
tween exclusivity and concurrence has not been “all or nothing” 
 
 440. See supra notes 176–85 and accompanying text; see also R.S. Radford, 
Regulatory Takings Law in the 1990’s: The Death of Rent Control? 21 SW. U. L. 
REV. 1019, 1029–30 (1992) (noting that although the Court struck down the 
District of Columbia’s rent control ordinance in 1924 because the exigency no 
longer existed, the concept of rent control has persisted). 
 441. Psalms 117. 
 442. See supra notes 306–08 and accompanying text. 
 443. See Field, supra note 363, at 927–34. 
 444. See Pfander, supra note 22, at 646–47, 656–57. 
 445. Mark D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against the View That Jack-
son’s Concurrence Resolves the Relation Between Congress and the Command-
er-in-Chief, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1705–06 (2007). 
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is that slippery slope arguments regarding the choice between 
exclusivity and concurrence are unconvincing;446 allowing con-
currence in one context has not meant that exclusivity has been 
rejected across the board. The choice between exclusivity and 
concurrence has not been made on the basis of transsubstantive 
principles (such as expressio unius est exclusio alterius to sup-
port exclusivity or an across-the-board rejection of expressio un-
ius to support concurrency), but instead has been made by 
means of context-specific analysis.447  
V.  METHODS FOR ADDRESSING CONFLICTS   
If two or more institutions have overlapping powers, it is 
possible that they could exercise their powers in inconsistent 
ways and thereby generate conflicts. Indeed, the possibility of 
conflict frequently is deemed to be a strong, and sometimes de-
finitive, argument against concurrency.448  
Such conflict anxiety, however, is overblown. There are 
many contexts where two or more institutions have overlapping 
powers, and American law has developed six different methods 
for addressing such interinstitutional conflicts.449 Context-
specific institutional considerations, rather than transsubstan-
tive principles, typically explain the selection of the method.450 
That we already have at our disposal multiple mechanisms for 
dealing with conflict suggests that the prospect of conflict is not 
on its own a sufficient reason to rule out concurrence. At most, 
the prospect of conflict constitutes a cost of concurrence that 
appropriately is weighed against the benefits that concurrence 
promises in a particular context. 
A. SIX CONFLICT-RESOLUTION APPROACHES  
Here is an overview of the six conflict-resolution approach-
es that can be found in American law. 
1.  Categorical Institution-Based Conflict Rule. One institu-
tion’s action categorically trumps the other institution. The Su-
premacy Clause is one such example, providing that federal law 
 
 446. See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 18, at 1051–55. 
 447. There are two competing ways this can be described: either as wise, 
case-by-case, common law reasoning or as unprincipled, ad hoc decision mak-
ing. I return to this question in Part VI. 
 448. See, e.g., MADISON, supra note 1, at 66. 
 449. Much of what follows in this Part is drawn from Rosen, supra note 
445, at 1717–31. 
 450. Id. at 1743–44. 
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categorically trumps state law.451 Another is the rule under 
which federal statutes categorically trump federal common law 
and dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. A final example 
comes from Justice Jackson’s famed concurrence in the Steel 
Seizure case.452 His Category Two recognized the possibility of 
same-effect concurrence as between Congress and the Presi-
dent,453 but Category Three provides that the President can act 
contrary to a statute only if he has independent power and 
Congress’s statute exceeded its powers.454 Together, these two 
categories mean that where the President and Congress have 
concurrent powers, Congress’s acts categorically trump presi-
dential acts.  
2.  Presumptive Institution-Based Conflict Rule. One insti-
tution presumptively, but noncategorically, trumps. For exam-
ple, juries presumptively have the power to find facts in Article 
III adjudications. The jury’s fact-finding powers, however, are 
only presumptive insofar as they can be displaced by the judge 
in limited circumstances: (1) before the jury has heard the case 
if the judge determines that a reasonable jury could not return 
a verdict for one of the parties455—a determination that almost 
invariably involves fact-finding by the judge—and (2) during 
trial or after the jury has rendered its verdict should the judge 
decide that there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for 
a reasonable jury to find on behalf of one of the parties456—
another determination that almost invariably involves judicial 
fact-finding.  
3.  First-in-Time Conflict Rule. The institution that acts 
first trumps. Examples include the application of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, as well as the common law doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel, all of which resolve potential 
conflicts among courts with overlapping adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion by providing that the second court is bound by the first 
court’s ruling.457  
 
 451. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 452. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 
634–55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). For a full discussion, see Rosen, supra 
note 445, at 1704–06. 
 453. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637. 
 454. Id. at 637–38. 
 455. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (laying 
out the standard for granting summary judgment). 
 456. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a), (b). 
 457. For a particularly bracing example of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause’s first-in-time rule, see Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908). 
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4.  Last-in-Time Conflict Rule. The institution that acts last 
trumps. Examples include the relation among treaties, con-
gressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agree-
ments, where conflicts are resolved on the basis of a last-in-
time rule.458 Another example can be found in the res judicata 
rule applicable to the unusual circumstance where the party in 
the second lawsuit neglected to assert the defense of res judica-
ta: “When in two actions inconsistent final judgments are ren-
dered, it is the later, not the earlier, judgment that is accorded 
conclusive effect in a third action under the rules of res judica-
ta.”459  
5.  Multifactor Conflict-Resolution Principles. Multifactor 
conflict-resolution principles identify multiple factors that are 
to be considered to resolve conflicts.460 An example includes the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws, which seeks to re-
solve conflicts where multiple states have overlapping regula-
tory jurisdiction by means of a virtual laundry list of considera-
tions.461  
6.  No-Sorting Principles. Under a no-sorting principle, the 
two institutions with overlapping authority are permitted to 
simultaneously act, even if they act inconsistently.462 There are 
several possible outcomes. First, the regulated entities may be 
subject to multiple rules simultaneously, some of which may 
conflict, and are expected to conform their behavior nonethe-
less.463 Other times, the different institutions with overlapping 
authority may formally or informally negotiate among them-
selves to coordinate their actions.464 Such coordination typically 
 
 458. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (regarding trea-
ties). For a description and defense, see Julian Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense 
of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 
325, 326–27 (2005). 
 459. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 (1980). The Res-
tatement rule is based on several Supreme Court cases. See Rosen, supra note 
445, at 1724 n.72. 
 460. See Rosen, supra note 445, at 1725–28. 
 461. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6(2) (1969).  
 462. For an example of a no-sorting principle in relation to congressional 
and judicial power to interpret the Constitution, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. 
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric In-
terpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2030–31 
(2003). 
 463. This is true of state criminal law generally, and also is reflected in the 
Double Jeopardy Clause’s “dual sovereignty” doctrine. See Rosen, supra note 
445, at 1728–30. 
 464. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 115, at 803 & n.95 (discussing the negotia-
tion among states that led to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 
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is undertaken by the political branches of government, not the 
courts.  
B. IMPLICATIONS  
That there are multiple conflict-resolution principles in 
United States law has many implications that merit article-
length treatment. Some crucial preliminary points nonetheless 
bear mention here. 
First and foremost, this array of principles should reduce 
anxiety over the possibility of concurrence-induced conflict. 
Simply put, there is an array of well-recognized methods for 
dealing with conflicts.  
Second, it is implicit in the multiplicity of conflict-
resolution principles that the possibility of conflict does not in-
variably lead to the deployment of any particular conflict-
resolution rule. Rather, some choice must be made among 
them. 
Past practice and logic point to many illuminating observa-
tions in relation to the choice among conflict-resolution prin-
ciples. The first two principles—categorical institution-based 
and presumptive institution-based conflicts rules—are applica-
ble where there is a hierarchical relationship between the insti-
tutions with overlapping powers.465 The fact that hierarchical 
supremacy does not invariably result in categorical supremacy 
is likely to be surprising to many, but the fact-finding powers 
exercised by Article III judges in jury trials proves the point; 
though the Seventh Amendment long has been understood as 
allocating fact-finding power to juries, and though the judge 
cannot act as a “thirteenth juror” and substitute her judgment 
for that of the jury, the judge can disregard the jury’s findings, 
make credibility assessments, and engage in other fact-finding 
in the process, in certain circumstances.466  
 
which resolved conflicts among states’ overlapping adjudicatory jurisdiction in 
child custody cases). A similar process of negotiation is present when bills 
from the House and Senate must be reconciled insofar as neither legislative 
body has the authority to trump the other’s inconsistent provisions. 
 465. Sometimes the hierarchical relationship is patently obvious, as in the 
cases of the Supremacy Clause and the supremacy of statute to judge-made 
federal common law. Other times the hierarchical relationship is less obvious. 
See Rosen, supra note 445, at 1732–39 (arguing that a definitive argument has 
not yet been made as to why Congress categorically trumps the President in 
relation to the latter’s Commander-in-Chief powers). 
 466. See supra Part II.B.1; see also Rosen, supra note 445, at 1718–19 (de-
scribing the dynamic between judge and jury created by FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b)). 
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The last four conflict-resolution principles are available 
when there is no obvious hierarchy among the institutions with 
overlapping powers. Though courts to date have not explicitly 
discussed on what basis they have decided among the four, in-
stitution-specific and context-specific considerations appear to 
have guided their choices. For example, institutional interests 
in preserving judicial resources and ensuring the finality of 
judgments have given rise to res judicata and collateral estop-
pel’s first-in-time principles.467 Likewise, the one exception to 
res judicata’s first-in-time principle—the so-called last-in-time 
rule in the case of multiple inconsistent final judgments—also 
was selected by the Supreme Court for institution-specific rea-
sons: the second inconsistent judgment came about because the 
parties to the second lawsuit neglected to press their res judica-
ta arguments, and the last-in-time rule refuses to reward such 
neglect or abuse.468 
Multifactor conflict-resolution principles are utilized where 
institutions have equivalent hierarchical rank and a timing 
rule either would not work or would exclude too many norma-
tively relevant considerations. As the number of relevant con-
siderations grows, however, multifactor conflict-resolution 
principles risk becoming ad hoc and unpredictable.  
The last conflict-resolution principle—a no-sorting prin-
ciple that eschews any method for resolving conflict—holds 
surprising promise. Though it could conceivably lead to chaos, 
it may instead lead to formal or informal negotiations among 
the institutions, particularly if they are repeat players who 
have a common interest in jointly solving a problem or present-
ing a united front.469 Indeed, a no-sorting principle may be de-
sirable for any number of reasons: to encourage interinstitu-
tional competition, to spur coordination or compromise, or 
when there appears to be no viable alternative conflict-
resolution approach.470 
 
 467. See generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326–28 
(1979). 
 468. See Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 552 (1947); Ruth B. Ginsburg, 
Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule for Con-
flicting Judgments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 798, 811 (1969). 
 469. For discussion of a similar concept in a parallel context, see Robert A. 
Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature 
of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 5, 23–29 (2007) (speaking of the role 
of “persuasion” rather than coercion in “intersystemic governance”). 
 470. See id. at 18–26. 
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Interestingly, Alexander Hamilton proposed a no-sorting 
principle in the course of the Pacificus-Helvidius debates.471 
Hamilton’s solution to the problem of possible conflicts appears 
when he discusses a hypothetical that pitted the President’s 
recognition power against Congress’s power to declare wars. 
Hamilton asks the reader to consider a circumstance where the 
United States had both a defensive and offensive treaty of al-
liance with France. If there were a revolution in France after 
the treaty were in place, the President would have to decide 
whether the “new rulers are competent organs of the National 
Will and ought to (be) recognized or not” pursuant to the Presi-
dent’s powers to “receive ambassadors”472 even though the act 
of recognition would “have laid the Legislature under an obliga-
tion . . . of exercising its power of declaring war” against the old 
government under the terms of the treaty of alliance.473 From 
this, Hamilton reasons that the President has the right, “in cer-
tain cases, to determine the condition of the Nation, though it 
may consequentially affect the proper or improper exercise of 
the Power of the Legislature to declare war.”474 Hamilton ad-
vances a no-sorting principle when he states that, notwith-
standing the President’s recognition of the new government, 
the President: 
[C]annot control the exercise of [Congress’s] power [to declare 
war] . . . The Legislature is free to perform its own duties according to 
its own sense of them—though the Executive in the exercise of its 
constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent state of things 
which ought to weigh in the legislative decisions.475 
In short, for Hamilton there is no formal mechanism for sorting 
out this potential interinstitutional conflict. Though one insti-
tution’s actions (the President’s) “ought to weigh”476 in the deci-
sions of the other, each institution ultimately is free to act ac-
cording to its own best judgment. 
VI.  THE BIG PICTURE: METANARRATIVES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS   
A. METANARRATIVES 
Is there a larger narrative or set of narratives that ex-
 
 471. See supra Part I.D. 
 472. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; HAMILTON, supra note 104, at 14–15. 
 473. HAMILTON, supra note 104, at 15. 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. 
 476. Id. (emphasis added). 
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plains the shift from exclusivity to concurrence across so many 
different doctrinal contexts? Four mutually compatible possibil-
ities suggest themselves.  
First, perhaps this Article has merely documented exam-
ples of the political analogy of the natural process of entropy; 
power allocated to one place does not remain there for long. 
This may have some explanatory power, but clearly more than 
entropy must be at work because the move from exclusivity to 
concurrence has not occurred everywhere. 
A second hypothesis—more powerful than the first—is that 
this Article has documented instances where the “law-on-the-
books” has caught up with the “law-in-action.”477 On this view, 
concurrence is not new, but just newly recognized by formal 
law.  
This perspective has some force. For example, though there 
have been non-Article III federal courts since the early days of 
the Republic, the Court long and vociferously denied that they 
exercised federal judicial power.478 The Court’s ultimate ac-
knowledgment in the latter twentieth century that Article I 
courts and Article III courts have significant swaths of concur-
rent power was a formal recognition of what had been rather 
than a judicial creation of a new system of overlapping pow-
ers.479 A corollary of the second hypothesis is that we likely 
have not yet reached the end of history, meaning that the “law-
on-the books” has not caught up with the “law-in-action” eve-
rywhere. For instance, a majority of the Supreme Court still in-
sists that administrative agencies do not exercise legislative 
power, though several Justices and the bulk of the scholarly 
community disagree.480  
A weakness of the second hypothesis is that it ignores, and 
thereby threatens to obscure, the fact that in some contexts 
there have been changes that have led to increasing concur-
rence. Consider the overlapping fact-finding power of judge and 
jury. Consistent with the second hypothesis, it is true that 
judges always have exercised important fact-finding powers 
through such devices as evidentiary rules, burdens of proof, 
 
 477. For a brief discussion, see Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 255 
n.194 (2009). 
 478. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828).  
 479. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 
(1986). 
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and presumptions (nineteenth century averments of exclusivity 
notwithstanding). Yet caselaw (such as the Munson decision) 
and modern procedural innovations (like summary judgment 
and judgment as a matter of law) have given judges even more 
fact-finding powers, significantly augmenting judges’ and ju-
ries’ overlapping powers.481  
A third possible metanarrative is that the trajectory from 
exclusivity to concurrence reflects an adaptation to changing 
times and needs. There is great power in this narrative. Some-
times the Court has said as much,482 and many of the reasons 
for concurrence documented in Part III483 boil down to this me-
tanarrative. The only respect in which this narrative does not 
fit the data is vis-à-vis those instances where concurrence has 
been with us from our nation’s start—such as President Wash-
ington’s Neutrality Proclamation and Chief Justice Marshall’s 
early acceptance of territorial courts. 
A final metanarrative is that the move from exclusivity to 
concurrence reflects a power-grab. The shift to concurrence has 
systematically extended one institution’s powers at the expense 
of other institutions; concurrence has made it easier for federal 
institutions to act, thereby extending federal power at the ex-
pense of states and the private sector. For instance, whereas 
federal statutes, which have the power to displace state law, 
can be created only via the cumbersome process of bicameral-
ism and presentment, agency rules, which also displace state 
law, are generated by a far more streamlined process. As a re-
sult, the federal government displaces far more state law than 
would an agency-free federal government. Likewise, more in-
ternational obligations can be made in today’s world of inter-
changeable treaties and congressional-executive agreements 
than in a treaty-only world where international obligations 
were created only when a supermajority of senators concurred.  
This final metanarrative does not explain all contexts 
where there has been a shift from exclusivity to concurrence; 
for example, it does not fit states’ exercise of extraterritorial 
regulatory powers.484 Further, it is contestable as to whether 
the narrative is applicable in respect of concurrence created by 
delegations. For example, is Congress’s delegation of rulemak-
 
 481. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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ing authority properly characterized as a power-grab? It all de-
pends on what institution is said to be doing the grabbing: the 
answer must be “no” from the perspective of Congress, but con-
ceivably could be “yes” from the vantage point of federal go-
vernmental powers insofar as agencies can create more federal 
law than Congress on its own could. Finally, even assuming the 
power-grab narrative to be applicable to large swaths of con-
temporary concurrence, it is unclear what if any normative or 
doctrinal significance power-grab has because it is a virtual 
tautology of concurrence for two reasons. First, concurrence fa-
cilitates government action, and in this sense is amenable to 
being described as a governmental power-grab; after all, con-
currence frequently arises because the governmental entity 
that plausibly could be said to hold an exclusive power has not 
acted sufficiently. Second, because action by one governmental 
institution almost always comes at the expense of some other 
societal institution, concurrence’s facilitation of governmental 
action necessarily constitutes a shift of decision-making author-
ity to the institution now exercising concurrent power, and in 
that sense always can be described as a power-grab.485  
B. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS  
Since reams have been written on the constitutionality of 
virtually every instance of concurrence examined herein, this 
Article cannot hope to definitively address any particular ex-
ample. By bringing together so many examples of concurrence 
from diverse doctrines, though, this Article highlights consider-
ations that are relevant to the constitutional analysis of each 
instance of concurrence.  
First, although it is not the case that the constitutional for-
tunes of all instances of concurrence are intertwined such that 
they all either stand or fall together, in analyzing any particu-
lar instance of concurrence it is relevant to recognize that con-
currence is not an unusual structural feature of United States 
constitutional law. Concurrence’s omnipresence should under-
mine the knee-jerk exclusivist opposition that frequently greets 
new proposals of concurrence. For example, the argument that 
courts should not devise common law solutions to asbestos or 
firearms problems because such issues fall within the legisla-
ture’s powers suffers from an unexamined exclusivist assump-
 
 485. For example, federal action displaces states and the private sector, 
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tion that only one institution has the constitutional power to 
address the problems. Concurrence’s widespread use puts a 
burden on those who make such exclusivity assumptions;486 op-
ponents of common law solutions must supply arguments as to 
why concurrence is undesirable in this context. 
Second, it is not the case that originalism is flatly hostile to 
concurrence. Alexander Hamilton endorsed concurrence in the 
Pacificus-Helvidius debates,487 and President Washington acted 
consistently with Hamilton’s position when he issued the Neu-
trality Proclamation.488 And there are other instances of con-
currence that date back to our country’s early days. For exam-
ple, Congress delegated lawmaking authority to the President 
beginning in the 1790s, and there have been non-Article III 
federal courts in the form of territorial courts from very early 
on as well.489 On the other hand, at least one instance of con-
temporary concurrence is patently contrary to the Founders’ 
understandings: the Framers thought that certain internation-
al obligations could only be created by treaty, and certainly 
would have rejected the contemporary consensus that treaties 
and congressional-executive agreements are interchangeable.490 
In short, originalism is not invariably inconsistent with concur-
rence, though particular instances of concurrence may be in 
tension with originalist understandings.  
Third, textualism is not invariably hostile to concurrence 
for two reasons. First, plausible arguments typically can be 
made that two institutions have overlapping powers on account 
of the different constitutional provisions that empower them; in 
other words, textualism is perfectly compatible with inherency-
generated same-effect concurrence. For example, given the long 
Anglo-American tradition of judicial common law powers, it 
seems perfectly plausible to suggest that federal courts’ Article 
III-granted judicial power creates a presumptive federal com-
mon law power that overlaps with Congress’s legislative pow-
ers.491 Second, because the Constitution almost never specifies 
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that a granted power may not be delegated, textualism is not 
inconsistent with delegation-generated concurrence.492  
In fact, textualism is in tension with concurrence only if it 
is bundled with a very strong principle of expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius.493 But, as this Article demonstrates, constitu-
tional law quite frequently refuses to invoke the canon of ex-
pressio unius (consider, for instance, Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinion in the 1828 Canter decision upholding territorial 
courts).494 And this is not patently mistaken, for textualism on 
its own does not entail expressio unius. That canon is an inter-
pretive presumption rather than an ironclad logical inference 
because a text’s express articulation plausibly can mean that 
the text takes a firm position only with respect to what is ex-
pressly articulated and no position with regard to unspecified 
matters. The First Congress, for example, took this approach to 
Article III’s grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court 
over “all Cases affecting Ambassadors,”495 for the 1789 Judi-
ciary Act provided that federal district courts also had original 
jurisdiction over certain cases affecting ambassadors.496 This 
statutory provision was found to be constitutional by the Su-
preme Court in the Ames decision.497  
Fourth, for those who belong to any of the “living constitu-
tionalism” schools of constitutional interpretation, it is illumi-
nating to observe the broad array of pragmatic considerations 
that has given rise to concurrence in past. Noteworthy as well 
is that the shift from exclusivity to concurrence generally oc-
curs at the initiative of extrajudicial institutions. 
At the end of the day, there are two types of concurrence 
that present difficult constitutional challenges. The first is con-
stitutional workarounds. Consider, for instance, the non-Article 
III Court of Claims that was created to get around Article III’s 
finality requirement.498 Is this a brilliant workaround, or an 
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unconstitutional end-run around Article III’s finality require-
ment? 
The second constitutional challenge is present when con-
currence allows the federal government to act in a circum-
stance where, without concurrence, the federal government 
would not, as a practical matter, have been able to act. The 
constitutional question is whether concurrence violates the 
principle of enumerated powers insofar as federal obligations 
triggering the Supremacy Clause are created outside of consti-
tutionally created mechanisms; it plausibly could be said that 
such mechanisms are deliberately cumbersome so as to con-
strain the quantity of federal law, thereby leaving more room 
for state regulation and private ordering.499 Consider in this 
regard rulemaking by federal agencies, which has enabled far 
more federal lawmaking than could have occurred if Congress 
alone acted. Another example is congressional-executive 
agreements (such as NAFTA) that create international obliga-
tions where less than two-thirds of the Senate would have 
voted for a treaty. Indeed, many of the examples of concurrence 
explored in this Article plausibly could be said to implicate this 
enumerated powers-based concern.500  
The workaround and enumerated-powers challenges both 
respond to a similar phenomenon: concurrence’s facilitating go-
vernmental action in a circumstance where exclusivity would 
have resulted in governmental inaction. In the end, though, 
these two objections reduce to a single question: does the prin-
ciple of expressio unius preclude concurrence? For example, 
without regard to Article III, Congress undoubtedly could es-
tablish, under any number of its Article I, Section 8 powers, 
courts of claims to adjudicate contract claims on behalf of and 
against the federal government. Similarly, without regard to 
the Treaty Power, NAFTA plausibly could be said to have fallen 
under Congress’s power to regulate foreign commerce. The 
question accordingly becomes whether Article III gives rise to 
the negative inference that the only types of federal adjudicato-
ry bodies that can be created are those that comply with Article 
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III’s requirements—and this is another way of stating the prin-
ciple of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.  
These are hard constitutional challenges. They are not suf-
ficiently strong to sustain a transsubstantive anticoncurrence 
principle, however, for two principal reasons.501  
First, particularly as regards the workaround challenge, 
the burden rests with those who would aim to establish a 
transsubstantive exclusivity principle on account of the fact 
that concurrence is a “long-continued practice, known to and 
acquiesced in by” all three branches of the federal govern-
ment.502 For purposes of determining whether there exists a 
transsubstantive constitutional principle of exclusivity, it is re-
levant to look not at any single instance of concurrence, but in-
stead at the wide range of concurrence that this Article docu-
ments. The sheer quantity of concurrence across multiple 
contexts and across time defeats the proposition that there ex-
ists a transsubstantive anticoncurrence principle. The 
longstanding and widespread practice of concurrence has acted 
as a “gloss” on the Constitution,503 definitively establishing that 
there is no transsubstantive constitutional principle of expres-
sio unius that categorically disallows concurrence.  
To be clear, this does not mean that all instances of concur-
rence are (or would be) constitutional.504 It does mean, howev-
er, that the constitutionality of any given instance of concur-
rence must be determined on the basis of context-specific 
analysis, not a transsubstantive anticoncurrence principle. 
 
 501. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that concurrence is never im-
permissible. This Article is not the place to identify the criteria that distin-
guish between permissible and impermissible instances of concurrence. For an 
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is not per se impermissible. 
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Second, the force of the two hard constitutional challenges 
is largely blunted by the hoary case of M’Culloch v. Mary-
land.505 In upholding Congress’s power to charter a national 
bank under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court re-
jected a strong principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
in favor of a “useful” interpretation that gave Congress the 
power to adopt “any means which tended directly to the execu-
tion of the constitutional powers of the government.”506 In the 
course of its opinion, the M’Culloch Court asked, “whence aris-
es the power to punish in cases not prescribed by the constitu-
tion” due to the fact that the power to punish “is expressly giv-
en [by the Constitution] in some cases.”507 Expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius is what fuels this interpretive question, and 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court rejected the ca-
non, reasoning that Congress’s powers to establish post offices 
included the power to “punish those who steal letters from the 
post office, or rob the mail” despite the Constitution’s silence 
vis-à-vis such punishments.508 In so doing, the M’Culloch opi-
nion could be accused of treating as “mere surplusage”509 the 
constitutional text specifying Congress’s powers to punish 
counterfeiters insofar as that power could have been inferred 
from Congress’s power to “coin Money.”510 M’Culloch’s holding 
likewise put pressure on the concept of enumerated powers. 
What led to a “useful” outcome and workable government over-
rode these considerations. 
The pragmatic considerations relied on by the Court in 
M’Culloch are directly relevant to concurrence. The Court re-
jected a narrow construction grounded in expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius because the Constitution was “intended to en-
dure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the 
various crises of human affairs.”511 M’Culloch refused to interp-
ret the Constitution as having “prescribed the means by which 
government should, in all future time, execute its powers” and 
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instead selected the construction that granted “the legisla-
ture . . . the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its 
reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.”512 
In this regard, the widespread and longstanding examples of 
concurrence explored in this Article reflect experience’s lesson 
that concurrence is, at the very least, “convenient, or useful”513 
for the execution of governmental powers. Indeed—even more 
than this—concurrence may be a necessary mechanism for en-
suring that government functions well in some contexts. 
To conclude, nothing in the Constitution expressly bars 
concurrence. Concurrence is no more inconsistent with expres-
sio unius est exclusio alterius and the concept of enumerated 
powers than was M’Culloch’s construction of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. If anything, concurrence implicates enumerated 
powers to a lesser degree than M’Culloch, for when a secondary 
federal actor (for example, an administrative agency) under-
takes actions that unquestionably fall within the power of a 
primary federal actor (such as Congress) there can be no con-
cern that the federal action has displaced authority that the 
Constitution intended to leave to states or to the private sector. 
Concurrence may be improper in particular contexts,514 but it 
cannot be declared unconstitutional across the board. 
  CONCLUSION   
Concurrence—the circumstance where multiple institu-
tions have the power to undertake act X despite the fact that 
constitutional text plausibly could be said to have allocated 
that power to a single institution—is a common, yet frequently 
overlooked, feature of American constitutional law. Concur-
rence has been present from our nation’s earliest days. For ex-
ample, President Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation re-
flected an understanding that both he and Congress had power 
to interpret a treaty that could have obligated the United 
States to go to war. And, too, the First Congress enacted sever-
al statutes that gave the President rulemaking authority. Nev-
ertheless, the Supreme Court almost always has initially re-
sisted claims of concurrence, insisting instead on exclusivist 
interpretations of the Constitution’s power-grants. For this rea-
son, concurrence typically has been initiated by nonjudicial in-
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stitutions, and has been judicially acknowledged only after be-
coming deeply entrenched.  
Concurrence carries an array of pragmatic benefits. Con-
currence frequently is turned to when the most obviously 
tasked institution has failed to act. Concurrence oftentimes is a 
mechanism for engaging competencies enjoyed by a second in-
stitution that are not present in the primarily tasked institu-
tion, holding out the promise of superior governmental decision 
making and action taking. Concurrence has been justified on 
the ground that it was necessary to address problems unfore-
seen by the Founders, to deal with emergencies, and to aug-
ment efficiency.  
The risk of generating conflicts is perhaps the main anxie-
ty occasioned by concurrence, but there are multiple tools 
present in United States law that address conflicts among in-
stitutions with overlapping powers. Accordingly, the risk of con-
flicts constitutes a cost of concurrence to be weighed against its 
potential benefits, but is not a reason for flatly rejecting con-
currence.  
Although widespread, concurrence is not found every-
where; many of the Constitution’s provisions always have been 
understood to allocate power exclusively, not concurrently. 
There is no general, transsubstantive principle that explains 
when constitutional power will be deemed to be exclusively or 
concurrently granted. No transsubstantive principle requires 
concurrence, nor do any transsubstantive principles (such as 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius or enumerated powers) 
render it a priori unconstitutional. Instead, the choice between 
exclusivity and concurrence has been made on a context-by-
context basis. There are good reasons to think this context-
specific analysis to be desirable, though the choice in any given 
context can be aided by considering concurrence’s costs and 
benefits in other contexts. 
 
 
